Is Okta down?

On October 29, 2026, at 6:45 AM PT, the Okta Engineering Team became aware of an issue with our Single Sign-On service. Administrators may be unable to add or update domain federations. Existing single sign-on (SSO) and end-user login sessions continue to function normally.  Our engineering team is actively monitoring a high-priority vendor support ticket regarding an underlying database replication design change affecting federation management. We will provide another update as soon as additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta-emea.com:1, okta.com:1, okta.com:2, okta.com:3, okta.com:4, okta.com:6, okta.com:7, oktapreview.com:1, oktapreview.com:2, okta.com:8, okta.com:9, okta.com:11, okta.com:12, oktapreview.com:3, okta.com:14, okta.com:16, okta.com:17, okta.com:18, okta.com:19, okta.com:20, okta.com:22, okta.com:23

On October 21, 2026, at 11:49 AM PT, the Engineering Team became aware of an issue with Group Push affecting our customers in US Cell 3. Impacted customers may experience delays with group push imports. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta.com:3

A subset of our customers are currently experiencing failures or severe delays in Group Push imports. Background jobs are either stuck in the "pushing" state or taking longer than usual to complete. Existing user access and active sessions remain unaffected. To mitigate the impact, we are continuing to scale up processing capacity. Next update in 30 minutes.

We are seeing recovery across the impacted Group Push imports. Mitigation efforts have significantly reduced the processing backlog. We are actively monitoring system stability and performance metrics. Next update in 30 minutes.

The issue causing Group Push failures has been resolved. Additional root cause information will be available within five business days.

We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On October 21st, 2026, at 11:48 AM PT, Okta customer reports alerted our engineering team of group push membership processing delays for US Cell OK3. During this time, customers may have experienced delays in Group Push operations. As a result, access for new membership changes to downstream provisioned applications was delayed. Root Cause Summary: The root cause of the processing delays was a legacy concurrency limit that restricted the overall throughput of background application reconciliation operations. During this time, surges in background asynchronous work exhausted the cell's maximum allowed concurrent reconciliation tasks. This limit was originally established as a protective measure but is no longer necessary, as other controls have replaced it. This restriction prevented the system from scaling up processing capacity, resulting in a backlog and extended wait times. Remediation Steps: Upon receiving the notifications, the Okta Engineering team immediately began investigating the spikes and delays. At 11:53 AM PT, they identified that the execution queue was growing. To alleviate the rising wait times for customers, the team increased processing capacity. By 12:51 PM PT, backlogs had cleared, and system stability returned to baseline parameters. Preventative Actions: To prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta has implemented the following: Tuned processing and throughput limits across all Okta cells Additionally, Okta is working on the following efforts to improve operational resilience: Reviewing and updating monitoring capabilities and alerting configurations across these background processes to ensure faster identification and notification of similar scenarios. Reviewing and updating service protection limits and establishing refined mitigation action thresholds where warranted. Total Duration: Total Duration (Minutes): 454 minutes  Actual Time: 5:17 AM - 12:51 PM PT

On October 21, 2026, at 11:00 AM PT, Engineering became aware of an issue with our cloud vendor affecting reporting services on EMEA Cell 9. During this time, reporting will not be available. Our team is actively working with our cloud vendor to mitigate the issue. We will provide another update within the next 1 hour, or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta.com:9

Our cloud vendor has made a configuration change as part of mitigation efforts and is monitoring for signs of recovery. Reporting services on EMEA Cell 9 may continue to be impacted. Our team is continues to monitor and work with our cloud vendor to fully mitigate the issue. We will provide another update within the next 1 hour, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

Monitoring is showing recovery of reporting services on EMEA Cell 9. We will continue to monitor with our cloud vendor until we can confirm full recovery. We will provide another update within the next 1 hour, or sooner if additional information becomes available.

The issue affecting reporting services on EMEA Cell 9 has been addressed. The third-party provider has deployed a fix, and all system metrics have stabilized. Additional root cause information will be available within 5 business days.

We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, or your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below is the RCA summary for a recent incident in which a third-party provider or downstream service experienced an issue that affected the Okta service. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent similar occurrences. Detection and Impact Okta automated monitoring detected an elevation in errors and service verification failures impacting reporting endpoints in cell OK9 starting at 11:55 AM PT on October 21, 2026. Okta engineers correlated the failures with a reported regional service disruption on the third-party provider's public status page and subsequently opened a priority support case with the vendor Customers in EMEA Cell OK9 experienced the following during this period: Administrators were unable to access the reporting interface or execute queries for administrative report data. Background processing for reporting events and user classification data was delayed, resulting in a temporary event backlog. Requests to analytics reporting application endpoints returned elevated HTTP 500 error responses. Core authentication, single sign-on, and directory management services were unaffected and remained fully operational throughout the incident. Root Cause Summary: A third-party cloud data provider that supports Okta's reporting infrastructure experienced a regional service outage in its Europe West (eu-west-1) region. According to the third-party provider, a configuration change applied to their cloud services layer interacted unexpectedly with existing configuration settings. This interaction caused a significant number of their service instances to be taken out of service, leading to cascading failures across core platform functions, including sign-in services, query execution, and data ingestion. Because Okta relies on this third-party provider to ingest, store, and query reporting and classification data, this external failure directly disrupted communication between Okta's reporting services and the underlying data layer. While Okta's core identity, access management, and authentication services remained fully functional, the disruption prevented Okta from querying or transmitting reporting data in the affected region. Consequently, administrative users in the impacted cell were unable to generate reports, and backend event data streams accumulated a processing backlog until third-party service availability was restored and Okta re-established backend connections. Remediation Steps: Okta engineers engaged provider support to actively monitor the infrastructure recovery efforts. The vendor resolved the underlying configuration issue in their cloud services layer and confirmed service restoration at 03:22 PM PT. Following the provider’s recovery, Okta engineers restarted the backend reporting connection services to clear residual connection errors and resume active data transmission. Okta verified that error rates returned to baseline levels, background reporting events and user classification backlogs were processed to completion, and that all reporting functionality was fully restored at 03:46 PM PT. Preventive Actions: Based on the internal post-incident review, Okta identified the following improvement areas to mitigate future occurrences and reduce recovery times: Expanding monitoring and alerting coverage for downstream data dependencies to reduce initial detection and escalation times. Updating operational recovery procedures to ensure backend reporting connection services are restarted immediately once downstream vendor recovery occurs. Timing: Incident start: October 21, 2026, at 11:05 AM PT Incident resolved: October 21, 2026, at 3:46 PM PT Duration (# of minutes): 281 minutes (4 hours 41 minutes)

At 13/10/2026 00:50 PT, the team became aware of an issue with to our Core Platform service affecting customers in EMEA Cell 1. During this time, users may be experiencing intermittent issues within our system. Our team is actively investigating this issue. We will provide another update within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta-emea.com:1

We have implemented a fix for the issue and are now seeing Okta Services restored. We will continue to monitor and provide an update in the next 30 mins.

The incident has been resolved. The services were in read only mode and actions were taken to restore service and return to normal operations. An RCA will be available within 5 business days.

We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact:  On October 10th at 12:50 AM PT, Okta’s monitoring systems alerted on-call teams to a database server issue on EMEA Cell EU1.  During this time, administrators and end users may have encountered Read Only Mode (See KB: https://support.okta.com/help/s/article/What-is-Oktas-Readonly-Mode ) during this period, as well as errors related to write operations and certain authentication flows. Root Cause Summary: The root cause of the disruption was an unexpected crash of the primary data store supporting the impacted cell, which automatically resulted in Okta application servers transitioning to Read Only mode to ensure data integrity.  Remediation Steps: Immediately upon receiving alerts, incident response processes were activated.  On-call incident responders analyzed the database service failure and took actions to failover to a healthy primary and restore service functionality.  Preventative Actions: In order to prevent and mitigate similar incidents in the future, Okta has currently implemented the following:  - Improved alerting for faster impact analysis  - Conducted a full scan of all database error log files to ensure this issue had not happened previously - Fixed a bug related to authentication failures during Read Only Mode related to Device Assurance checks Additionally, Okta is reviewing operating procedures to recover the service faster and is currently working with external infrastructure vendors to investigate the underlying cause of the database crash. Duration (# of minutes): 35

At 10/13/2026 6:00 AM PT, the Okta team became aware of an issue with Group Push affecting customer operations in EMEA Cell 1. Our team is actively investigating this issue and to mitigate the issue. We will provide another update within the next 1 hour, or sooner if additional information becomes available. Affected cells: okta-emea.com:1

The Okta Engineering team has identified the root cause affecting Group Push for select applications. New Group Push operations initiated outside the affected window are processing successfully. We are actively mitigating and working to resolve the impacted jobs. We will provide further updates as the situation progresses.

Following the implementation of a mitigation action, job processing has resumed, and the backlog of pending operations is steadily declining. Our engineering team continues to work to clear the remaining queue and restore full functionality for all affected customers. Our next update will be in 30 minutes or sooner if additional information becomes available.

Job processing has resumed for the majority of impacted customers, and we're continuing to monitor residual impact across the remaining subset. Customer Support will continue to reach out directly to customers still experiencing the residual impact to provide a status update and next steps. Engineering remains engaged to fully resolve outstanding cases. Our next update will be in 15 minutes or sooner if there's a change in status.

The issue causing Group Push failures has been resolved. Our Support teams remain in direct contact with affected customers to address any lingering impact. Additional root cause information will be available within five business days.

We sincerely apologize for any impact this incident has caused to you, your business, and your customers. At Okta, trust and transparency are our top priorities. Outlined below are the facts regarding this incident. We are committed to implementing improvements to the service to prevent future occurrences of this incident. Detection and Impact: On October 13th, 2026, at 5:57 AM PT, Okta customer reports alerted our engineering team of group push membership processing delays for EMEA Cell EU1. During this time, customers may have experienced delays in Group Push operations. Administrators discovered the issue only when downstream applications failed to reflect changes or when "Last Push" timestamps were updated without completing, ultimately delaying access to new membership changes in provisioned downstream applications. Root Cause Summary: The root cause was a previously deployed configuration change intended to reduce impact on datastore CPU. However, this change had the unintended side effect of ultimately delaying the update of group membership in downstream provisioned applications. Remediation Steps: At 6:57 AM PT, Engineering identified the root cause of the delay and promptly reverted the configuration change. To accelerate recovery and clear the resulting backlog, engineering temporarily increased processing capacity, allowing the backlog of group membership processing to return to nominal processing rates. These actions successfully addressed the issue, and normal operations were restored by 9:07 AM PT. Preventative Actions: In order to prevent similar incidents from happening again, Okta has implemented the following: Updated alerts for identification and faster notification of these scenarios Additionally, Okta is reviewing testing scenarios and monitoring these processes. Duration (# of minutes): 567