Microsoft Azure incident
Network Connectivity – Gateway service degradation in multiple regions
Resolved after 5 hours 45 minutes, on September 30, 2026.
Incorrect Region: correction: Impacted region(s) within a previous communication has been corrected. What happened? Between 20:30 UTC on 30 September 2026 and 02:15 UTC on 01 October 2026, a subset of customers using gateway services in multiple regions experienced degraded or interrupted network connectivity. Impacted customers may have observed gateways failing to load in the Azure Portal, along with failures or delays in network management operations across the following impacted services. • Azure ExpressRoute Gateway • Azure Firewall • Azure Application Gateway and Web Application Firewall • Azure VPN Gateway • Azure VMware Solution What do we know so far? Our investigation identified that a recent change to a regional gateway management service triggered a higher-than-expected load when an unrelated operating system servicing maintenance proceeded gradually through multiple regions. Normally, this gateway management service would auto scale as needed. Demand on dependent services increased due to the increased workload, preventing these regional services from scaling as expected. The operating system servicing maintenance was paused as a precaution. We reverted the contributing regional gateway manager change, which reduced gateway manager load and allowed affected services to recover. We are continuing to investigate the scaling behavior and the safeguards needed to help prevent recurrence. How did we respond? • 20:30 UTC on 30 September 2026 – Customer impact began. • 21:29 UTC on 30 September 2026 – We began investigating connectivity issues affecting Azure ExpressRoute Gateway in UK South. • 22:27 UTC on 30 September 2026 – We identified that the issue was affecting multiple Azure regions and expanded our investigation. • 23:05 UTC on 30 September 2026 – We identified a correlation with operating system servicing activity and paused further servicing while we worked to restore affected services. • 01:36 UTC on 01 October 2026 – Recovery progressed across most affected regions, while configuration changes were applied to remaining impacted regions, including France Central, North Europe, Southeast Asia, UK South, and UK West. • 02:15 UTC on 01 October 2026 – We confirmed that the issue was mitigated. What happens next? • Our team will be completing an internal retrospective to understand the incident in more detail. Once that is completed, generally within 14 days, we will publish a Post Incident Review (PIR) to all impacted customers. • To get notified when that happens, and/or to stay informed about future Azure service issues, make sure that you configure and maintain Azure Service Health alerts – these can trigger emails, SMS, push notifications, webhooks, and more: https://aka.ms/ash-alerts. • For more information on Post Incident Reviews, refer to https://aka.ms/AzurePIRs. • The impact times above represent the full incident duration, so are not specific to any individual customer. Actual impact to service availability may vary between customers and resources – for guidance on implementing monitoring to understand granular impact: https://aka.ms/AzPIR/Monitoring • Finally, for broader guidance on preparing for cloud incidents, refer to https://aka.ms/incidentreadiness.
Update timeline
- monitoring Sep 30, 2026, 08:30 PM UTC
We are investigating an alert for Azure ExpressRoute Gateway in multiple Azure regions. We will provide more information as it becomes available.
- monitoring Sep 30, 2026, 08:30 PM UTC
Starting at 20:30 UTC on 30 September 2026, customers using ExpressRoute and/or Azure VPN Gateway may experience degraded or interrupted connectivity. We are also seeing impact to components responsible for managing network gateways, which may affect some management operations. Our investigation has identified a correlation between the onset of impact and infrastructure ‘operating system’ servicing activity. During this activity, some network gateway instances became unhealthy or temporarily unavailable. We have observed different recovery behavior across the affected services. Many impacted ExpressRoute gateways are recovering as the servicing operation completes. However, some supporting management components have not recovered automatically, and we are actively working to restore those components. Our current working hypothesis is that infrastructure operating system servicing is triggering an unexpected condition in some network service instances. We have not yet confirmed the underlying failure mechanism and are continuing to investigate why affected instances became unhealthy and why recovery behavior differs between services. We have paused further operating system servicing associated with this activity to prevent new instances from entering the affected servicing workflow. In parallel, our engineering teams are restoring network management components that have not recovered automatically as well as evaluating additional recovery actions for resources that remain unhealthy. We are continuing to monitor recovery across the affected services and will provide additional information within the next 30 minutes or as events warrant.
- monitoring Sep 30, 2026, 08:30 PM UTC
Starting at 20:30 UTC on 30 September 2026, customers using ExpressRoute and/or VPN Gateway may experience degraded or interrupted network connectivity. Customers may also experience failures or delays when performing some network management operations. Current status: We have paused the infrastructure servicing activity associated with the onset of this event, preventing additional resources from entering the affected servicing workflow. We are seeing continued recovery across impacted ExpressRoute gateways and are monitoring this recovery to confirm that it remains durable. For VPN Gateway, some affected gateways have experienced reduced redundancy rather than a complete loss of connectivity. Recovery continues to be monitored. Some supporting network management components have not recovered automatically and are contributing to management operation failures in a subset of affected regions. Engineering teams are actively restoring these components using alternate healthy instances where available. Our investigation continues to show a correlation between this event and infrastructure operating system servicing activity. However, the underlying failure mechanism has not yet been confirmed. We are investigating why some network service instances became unhealthy and why recovery behavior has differed between services. We will provide additional information within the next 30 minutes, or sooner if events warrant.
- postmortem Oct 01, 2026, 02:15 AM UTC
Join either of our upcoming 'Azure Incident Retrospective' livestreams discussing this incident (to hear from our engineering leaders, and to get any questions answered by our experts) or watch a recording of the livestream (available the following week, on YouTube): • Option #1 - 18:30 to 19:00 UTC on 22 October 2026 - https://aka.ms/air/7Q30-010/1 • Option #2 - 06:30 to 07:00 UTC on 23 October 2026 - https://aka.ms/air/7Q30-010/2 What happened? Between 20:30 UTC on 30 September 2026 and 02:15 UTC on 1 October 2026, customers using several Azure networking services – including Azure ExpressRoute Gateway, Azure Application Gateway, Azure Firewall, Azure Bastion, Azure Virtual WAN, and Azure VPN Gateway – experienced intermittent failures when performing service management operations. In addition, a subset of upgraded Azure ExpressRoute gateways could not retrieve their required configuration from the control plane service, resulting in temporary connectivity loss. Customers using Azure VMware Solution may also have temporarily lost network connectivity to their software-defined datacenter environments. The issue affected multiple regions including Australia Central 2, Australia Southeast, Austria East, Belgium Central, Canada East, Central US, Chile Central, Denmark East, East Asia, France Central, Germany North, Germany West Central, India South Central, Indonesia Central, Japan West, Jio India Central, Korea Central, Malaysia West, North Europe, Norway West, South Africa North, South Central US, South India, Southeast Asia, Sweden South, Switzerland North, Taiwan North, UAE North, UK South, West Europe, West US, West US 2, and West US 3. The issue began when a platform-triggered gateway update resumed across multiple regions, increasing request volume to the regional gateway control plane service, thereby affecting its ability to process management operations reliably. Impact times varied region by region, as the issue was triggered by a rolling update moving through the regions. We paused this update while applying a configuration change in phases to restore the control plane service. The last wave of customer impact was mitigated at 02:15 UTC on 1 October 2026. What went wrong and why? Azure regularly applies operating system and security updates to networking gateway services. These updates are designed to roll out gradually across deployment stages and redundant gateway instances, allowing service health to be evaluated before updates proceed. Before this incident, a temporary deployment restriction had paused operating system updates for a group of networking gateways. When this restriction expired, a large number of gateway updates resumed within a short period, generating a surge in gateway restarts and configuration-retrieval requests. At the same time, a previously deployed change had increased the processing time required for configuration operations handled by a shared regional networking control plane service. The combination of increased request volume and longer processing times overwhelmed the control plane, affecting its ability to process requests reliably. As a result, management operations for several Azure networking services failed intermittently. Existing request-throttling and load-protection mechanisms did not sufficiently protect critical processing under these conditions. For Azure ExpressRoute Gateway, an additional issue prolonged connectivity impact. Gateway instances restarting during the update process were marked healthy before their configuration and routing state had been fully restored. This allowed updates to proceed to another redundant instance before the first instance was ready. Consequently, some gateways temporarily lost connectivity to connected on-premises networks because neither instance could retrieve the required routing configuration. After approximately 30 minutes of unsuccessful configuration-retrieval attempts, the affected gateways automatically applied their locally stored last known good (LKG) configurations and restored connectivity. Automated monitoring detected ExpressRoute connectivity degradation at 20:43 UTC on 30 September 2026, followed by broader control plane degradation at 20:58 UTC. We pursued several recovery approaches in parallel, including pausing further gateway updates at 21:45 UTC, shifting control plane traffic, and attempting to add resources. Although these actions provided temporary relief, they did not fully resolve the issue. Further investigation identified the combination of elevated request volume and increased processing time per operation as the primary contributing factors. Once this was understood, we began rolling back the change that had increased control plane processing time, starting at 01:15 UTC on 1 October 2026. The rollback was applied across the affected regions, and customer impact ended at 02:15 UTC. How did we respond? • 20:30 UTC on 30 September 2026 – Customer impact began, with intermittent failures affecting management operations across multiple Azure networking services. • 20:43 UTC on 30 September 2026 – ExpressRoute monitoring detected connectivity degradation. • 20:58 UTC on 30 September 2026 – Control plane monitoring detected health failures across additional regions. • 21:12 UTC on 30 September 2026 – Multiple teams were engaged to investigate the issue and coordinate response efforts. • 21:45 UTC on 30 September 2026 – Further gateway operating system updates were paused to prevent additional update activity. • 22:09 UTC on 30 September 2026 – Traffic shifting actions provided temporary relief, but elevated resource utilization returned. Further traffic shifts were stopped. • 22:15 UTC on 30 September 2026 – Attempts to add control plane resources were investigated, and constraints involving dependent platform services were addressed. • 22:36 UTC on 30 September 2026 – Affected ExpressRoute gateways automatically restored connectivity using their last known good configurations. • 23:55 UTC on 30 September 2026 – We identified increased processing time for gateway configuration operations were associated with a previously deployed performance change, so we determined that a rollback would be a relevant mitigation. • 01:15 UTC on 1 October 2026 – The rollback began in an initial region, where the results were validated before proceeding. • 02:15 UTC on 1 October 2026 – The rollback was completed across the affected regions, and customer impact ended. How are we making incidents like this less likely or less impactful? • We have rolled back the change that introduced the performance regression, to de-risk this failure mode immediately. (Completed) • We are improving how paused operating system updates resume, to ensure they follow staged rollout practices rather than resuming across large numbers of gateways at once. (Estimated completion: October 2026) • We are strengthening ExpressRoute gateway health checks, to ensure that redundant instances are updated only after the initial instances have fully restored its configuration and routing state. (Estimated completion: March 2027) • We are addressing platform issues that prevented the control plane service from scaling out successfully during the incident. (Estimated completion: March 2027) • In the longer term, we are improving throttling and load-shedding mechanisms in the control plane service to help protect critical request processing during unexpected increases in demand. (Estimated completion: June 2027) How can customers make Incidents like this less impactful? • There was nothing that customers could have done to avoid or minimize impact from this specific service incident. • More generally, consider evaluating the reliability of your applications using guidance from the Azure Well-Architected Framework and its interactive Well-Architected Review: https://aka.ms/AzPIR/WAF • The impact times above represent the overall incident duration and are not specific to any individual customer. Actual impact varied by service, region, customer, and resource. For guidance on implementing monitoring to understand granular impact: https://aka.ms/AzPIR/Monitoring • Finally, consider ensuring that the right people in your organization are notified about any future service issues by configuring Azure Service Health alerts. These can trigger emails, SMS, push notifications, webhooks, and more: https://aka.ms/AzPIR/Alerts How can we make our incident communications more useful? You can rate this PIR and provide any feedback using our quick 3-question survey: https://aka.ms/AzPIR/7Q30-010
- postmortem Oct 01, 2026, 02:15 AM UTC
Incorrect Region: correction: Impacted region(s) within a previous communication has been corrected. What happened? Between 20:30 UTC on 30 September 2026 and 02:15 UTC on 01 October 2026, a subset of customers using gateway services in multiple regions experienced degraded or interrupted network connectivity. Impacted customers may have observed gateways failing to load in the Azure Portal, along with failures or delays in network management operations across the following impacted services. • Azure ExpressRoute Gateway • Azure Firewall • Azure Application Gateway and Web Application Firewall • Azure VPN Gateway • Azure VMware Solution What do we know so far? Our investigation identified that a recent change to a regional gateway management service triggered a higher-than-expected load when an unrelated operating system servicing maintenance proceeded gradually through multiple regions. Normally, this gateway management service would auto scale as needed. Demand on dependent services increased due to the increased workload, preventing these regional services from scaling as expected. The operating system servicing maintenance was paused as a precaution. We reverted the contributing regional gateway manager change, which reduced gateway manager load and allowed affected services to recover. We are continuing to investigate the scaling behavior and the safeguards needed to help prevent recurrence. How did we respond? • 20:30 UTC on 30 September 2026 – Customer impact began. • 21:29 UTC on 30 September 2026 – We began investigating connectivity issues affecting Azure ExpressRoute Gateway in UK South. • 22:27 UTC on 30 September 2026 – We identified that the issue was affecting multiple Azure regions and expanded our investigation. • 23:05 UTC on 30 September 2026 – We identified a correlation with operating system servicing activity and paused further servicing while we worked to restore affected services. • 01:36 UTC on 01 October 2026 – Recovery progressed across most affected regions, while configuration changes were applied to remaining impacted regions, including France Central, North Europe, Southeast Asia, UK South, and UK West. • 02:15 UTC on 01 October 2026 – We confirmed that the issue was mitigated. What happens next? • Our team will be completing an internal retrospective to understand the incident in more detail. Once that is completed, generally within 14 days, we will publish a Post Incident Review (PIR) to all impacted customers. • To get notified when that happens, and/or to stay informed about future Azure service issues, make sure that you configure and maintain Azure Service Health alerts – these can trigger emails, SMS, push notifications, webhooks, and more: https://aka.ms/ash-alerts. • For more information on Post Incident Reviews, refer to https://aka.ms/AzurePIRs. • The impact times above represent the full incident duration, so are not specific to any individual customer. Actual impact to service availability may vary between customers and resources – for guidance on implementing monitoring to understand granular impact: https://aka.ms/AzPIR/Monitoring • Finally, for broader guidance on preparing for cloud incidents, refer to https://aka.ms/incidentreadiness.
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