Multiple products in us-central1-b are experiencing network service degradation.

Update timeline

1. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 04:03 PM UTC

   Description: We are experiencing a networking issue starting Tuesday, 2026-09-01 07:41 US/Pacific. The issue is affecting a portion of the us-central1-b zone. The remaining zones in the region are unaffected. Our network engineering team has put in mitigations and we are seeing services starting to recover. We will provide more information by Tuesday, 2026-09-01 09:30 US/Pacific with current details. We apologize to all who are affected by the disruption. Customer symptoms: Customers are experiencing elevated packet loss and errors. * BigQuery * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud SQL * App Engine * Cloud Run * AlloyDB * Cloud Bigtable * Cloud Spanner * Compute Engine * Cloud VPN * Cloud Interconnect * Cloud NAT * Cloud Filestore * Cloud Hybrid Connectivity * Virtual Private Cloud * Google Kubernetes Engine * Looker (Google Cloud core) Workaround: * Customers with service layer retries may see successful completions as only a portion of the zone is affected. * Customers that are severely affected and have services available in alternate zones can failover to alternate zones.

2. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 04:19 PM UTC

   Description: The issue is affecting a portion of the us-central1-b zone. The remaining zones in the region are unaffected. Following network-level mitigation efforts, the underlying network infrastructure has fully recovered. Product engineering teams across Cloud are currently validating the recovery status of individual services. We will provide more information by Tuesday, 2026-09-01 10:00 US/Pacific with current details. Customer symptoms: Customers are experiencing elevated packet loss and errors. * BigQuery * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud SQL * App Engine * Cloud Run * AlloyDB * Cloud Bigtable * Cloud Spanner * Compute Engine * Cloud VPN * Cloud Interconnect * Cloud NAT * Cloud Filestore * Cloud Hybrid Connectivity * Virtual Private Cloud * Google Kubernetes Engine * Looker (Google Cloud core) * Apigee * Google SecOps SOAR Workaround: * Customers with service layer retries may see successful completions as only a portion of the zone is affected. * Customers that are severely affected and have services available in alternate zones can failover to alternate zones.

3. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 05:09 PM UTC

   Description: The issue is affecting a portion of the us-central1-b zone. The remaining zones in the region are unaffected. Most of the products have recovered and the engineering team is still validating a few remaining product impacts. We will provide more information by Tuesday, 2026-09-01 11:00 US/Pacific with current details. Customer symptoms: Customers are experiencing elevated packet loss and errors. * Cloud Run * App Engine Following products have recovered * BigQuery * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud Bigtable * Compute Engine * Cloud Hybrid Connectivity * Cloud Filestore * Virtual Private Cloud * Cloud Spanner * Google Kubernetes Engine * Cloud SQL * AlloyDBCloud VPN * Apigee * Cloud Interconnect * Cloud NAT * Looker (Google Cloud core) * Google SecOps SOAR * Cloud Firestore Workaround: * Customers with service layer retries may see successful completions as only a portion of the zone is affected. * Customers that are severely affected and have services available in alternate zones can failover to alternate zones.

4. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 06:01 PM UTC

   Description: The issue is affecting a portion of the us-central1-b zone. The remaining zones in the region are unaffected. Most of the products have recovered and the engineering team is still validating a few remaining product impacts. Routine network maintenance triggered issues in us-central1-b. We have recovered the network capacity that was impacted and restored all zonal and regional services. Maintenance in the region has been halted while proactive audits are carried out. We will provide more information by Tuesday, 2026-09-01 12:30 US/Pacific with current details. Customer symptoms: Customers are experiencing elevated packet loss and errors. * Cloud Run * App Engine Following products have recovered * BigQuery * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud Bigtable * Compute Engine * Cloud Hybrid Connectivity * Cloud Filestore * Virtual Private Cloud * Cloud Spanner * Google Kubernetes Engine * Cloud SQL * AlloyDBCloud VPN * Apigee * Cloud Interconnect * Cloud NAT * Looker (Google Cloud core) * Google SecOps SOAR * Cloud Firestore Workaround: * Customers with service layer retries may see successful completions as only a portion of the zone is affected.

5. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 06:36 PM UTC

   Description: The issue is affecting a portion of the us-central1-b zone. The remaining zones in the region are unaffected. Most of the products have recovered. The impacted products Cloud Run and App Engine are also seeing recovery and the errors have lowered pre-incident levels. Engineering continues to monitor and validate. Routine network fabric path maintenance triggered unexpected issues in two clusters in us-central1-b. We have recovered the network capacity that was impacted and restored all zonal and regional services. Maintenance in the region has been halted while proactive audits are carried out. We will provide more information by Tuesday, 2026-09-01 12:30 US/Pacific with current details. Customer symptoms: Customers are experiencing elevated packet loss and errors. * Cloud Run * App Engine Following products have recovered * BigQuery * Cloud Dataflow * Cloud Bigtable * Compute Engine * Cloud Hybrid Connectivity * Cloud Filestore * Virtual Private Cloud * Cloud Spanner * Google Kubernetes Engine * Cloud SQL * AlloyDBCloud VPN * Apigee * Cloud Interconnect * Cloud NAT * Looker (Google Cloud core) * Google SecOps SOAR * Cloud Firestore Workaround: * Customers with service layer retries may see successful completions as only a portion of the zone is affected.

6. resolved Sep 01, 2026, 07:12 PM UTC

   Description: The issue was affecting a portion of the us-central1-b zone. The remaining zones in the region were unaffected. All the impacted products have recovered. From preliminary analysis, routine network fabric path maintenance triggered unexpected issues in one cluster in us-central1-b. We have recovered the network capacity that was impacted and restored all zonal and regional services. Maintenance in the region has been halted while proactive audits are carried out. We thank you for your patience while we worked on resolving the issue. Customer symptoms: Customers experienced elevated packet loss and errors. Workaround: The issue has been mitigated.

7. resolved Sep 03, 2026, 05:47 PM UTC

   Affected services and features: * Google Compute Engine: Inability to access virtual machines externally, and inability for VMs to reach remote resources. * Google Kubernetes Engine: Unreachable regional/zonal clusters and nodes within the affected zone, prompting delayed cluster recovery times. * Cloud Run / Google App Engine: Temporary latency spikes and pending queue aborts as backend workloads automatically evacuated and shifted to healthy capacity. A subset of workloads in the specifically impacted area experienced degradation until 11:52 US/Pacific. * Cloud SQL, AlloyDB for PostgreSQL, Cloud Spanner, Google Cloud Bigtable, Cloud Filestore: Data access and connectivity severed for instances localized strictly to the impacted infrastructure. * Virtual Private Cloud (VPC), Cloud NAT, Apigee, Google BigQuery, Google Cloud Dataflow, Looker, Google SecOps SOAR, Hybrid Connectivity, Cloud Interconnect: Elevated network packet loss, connectivity drops, and API timeouts in the impacted zone.

8. resolved Sep 10, 2026, 09:20 PM UTC

   Affected services and features: * Google Compute Engine: Inability for users in the affected portion of us-central1-b and us-central1-f zones to access virtual machines externally, and inability for VMs to reach remote resources. * Cloud SQL, AlloyDB for PostgreSQL, Google Cloud Bigtable, Cloud Filestore: Data access and connectivity severed for instances localized strictly to the impacted infrastructure. * Cloud Spanner, Cloud Firestore: Elevated Remote Procedure Call (RPC) error rates, write timeouts, and latency spikes for the nam5 multi-region instances due to severed connectivity to components running in the impacted zone. * Virtual Private Cloud (VPC), Cloud NAT, Apigee, Google BigQuery, Google Cloud Dataflow, Looker, Google SecOps SOAR, Hybrid Connectivity, Cloud Interconnect: Elevated network packet loss, connectivity drops, and API timeouts in the impacted zone. * Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE): Between 07:40 and 09:15 US/Pacific on 2026-09-01, customers experienced errors and timeouts on requests to their GKE cluster control planes (Kubernetes API servers) in us-central1. This could have caused new or updated workloads to fail scheduling and Kubernetes API operations to fail. * Cloud Run / Google App Engine: Temporary latency spikes and pending queue aborts as backend workloads automatically evacuated and shifted to healthy capacity. A subset of workloads in the specifically impacted area experienced degradation until 11:52 US/Pacific. Customer impact: Customers with resources hosted in the specific affected clusters within us-central1-b and us-central1-f experienced a complete loss of network connectivity starting at 07:41 US/Pacific. During this time, virtual machines and associated services became unreachable from the internet and from other Google Cloud regions, and those internal resources could not initiate outbound connections. The issue was detected almost immediately and engineers took traffic diversion actions at 07:45 and 08:00 US/Pacific to reduce impact to regional products. By 08:50 US/Pacific, the majority of physical connections were restored and traffic began recovering, and the traffic diversion actions were removed at 09:19 US/Pacific. Full recovery across nearly all affected services and long-running operations was confirmed by 11:52 US/Pacific. Because the network isolation was strictly limited to specific clusters within us-central1-b and us-central1-f, multi-zonal deployments correctly utilizing redundancy across other zones in us-central1 were largely able to bypass the physical hardware failure and continue serving traffic. Customers with projects in both us-central1-b and us-central1-f would not have seen multi-zonal impact - at most one of their zones would have capacity in the affected data center.

9. resolved Sep 29, 2026, 04:09 PM UTC

   Addendum to Incident Report This addendum extends the Detailed Description of Impact from the previous message. Though only two clusters in a datacenter in us-central1-b and us-central1-f experienced network isolation, a few regional products with a dependency on the affected datacenter were also affected. Between 07:41 and 11:52 US/Pacific on Tuesday, September 1, 2026, the following products were affected: - Compute Engine VMs: VMs running in the affected data center lost network connectivity to resources located outside of their datacenter. From a Compute Engine perspective, this incident only affected a subset of VMs in us-central1-b and us-central1-f. - Zonal and Regional Products Based on Compute Engine Products with dependencies on VMs in the affected datacenter experienced symptoms like connection timeouts or service unavailability because the underlying VMs lost network connectivity. Examples of products that are based on Compute Engine VMs include: Apigee, Cloud SQL, AlloyDB for PostgreSQL, Dataflow, Cloud Filestore, and Looker. - Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE): GKE clusters whose control plane had dependencies on Compute Engine VMs in the affected clusters experienced errors and timeouts when administrators or nodes attempted to connect to the Kubernetes API server. Consequently, deployments might have been delayed, Kubernetes API operations might have failed, and new nodes might not have registered with the control plane (causing node pool operational delays). - Cloud Run and App Engine: Workloads in the us-central1 region experienced elevated serving latency, 5xx aborted request errors, and outbound connectivity degradation. To prevent severe request failures, traffic was diverted to other clusters. Diverting requests to other clusters temporarily caused elevated latency or errors in those clusters.Once the impacted cluster was restored, workload demand for these new backends created a 'thundering herd' of concurrent instance initializations. This sudden surge bypassed warm caches and overwhelmed internal file-serving tiers, extending symptoms until emergency capacity was provisioned. - Other Google APIs and Services, in us-central1 or a multi-region that includes us-central1, were affected if they had dependencies on software tasks in the affected clusters and weren't able to use software tasks in an unaffected cluster. Symptoms included connection timeouts or service unavailability. Examples of other Google APIs and services are: Google Cloud Bigtable, BigQuery, Google SecOps SOAR, Cloud Spanner, and Cloud Firestore. For some services, symptoms were limited to temporary latency spikes and service unavailability until workloads shifted to unaffected clusters. - Private Service Connect: Clients (in any region) experienced connectivity issues involving PSC endpoints with dependencies in us-central1, in specific circumstances: - PSC endpoints for Google APIs were affected in the same way as noted in the Google APIs and services section. - Producer/consumer PSC endpoints were affected if the producer had load balancers or backend VMs in the affected clusters of us-central1. - Hybrid Connectivity: Some Cloud Router, Cloud VPN, and Cloud Interconnect VLAN attachments in us-central1 were affected in specific circumstances: - Cloud Router BGP software tasks for some Cloud Routers in us-central1 experienced a Cloud Router maintenance event if their BGP software tasks were running in the affected clusters. - Cloud VPN tunnel software tasks running in the affected clusters lost network connectivity. This caused some Cloud VPN tunnels in us-central1 to go down until a replacement tunnel task in a different cluster was assigned. - Resources (in any region) sending packets through Cloud Interconnect VLAN attachments in us-central1 might have experienced intermittent connectivity issues in certain situations where network flows weren’t already programmed. - Envoy-based load balancers and other products: Load balancers and other products that depended on managed Envoy tasks of a proxy-only subnet in us-central1 experienced increased latency or connectivity issues if enough Envoy tasks were in the affected clusters. The following products were affected: - Regional external application load balancers in us-central1 - Regional internal application load balancers in us-central1 - Cross-region internal application load balancers with proxies in us-central1 - Regional external proxy network load balancers in us-central1 - Regional internal proxy network load balancers in us-central1 - Cross-region internal proxy network load balancers with proxies in us-central1 - Secure Web Proxy in us-central1