Atlassian Outage History

Started Sep 16, 2026, 09:32 AM UTC· resolved Sep 16, 2026, 10:15 AM UTC

1. monitoring Sep 16, 2026, 09:32 AM UTC

   We have identified and resolved the underlying issue causing delays and stuck builds in Bitbucket Pipelines. System recovery is in progress, and we are actively monitoring the pipeline queues to ensure builds are processing normally. Action Recommended: If you have pipelines or builds that remain queued or are stalled, we recommend rerunning them or triggering a new build. We will continue to monitor the service closely and provide a final update once stability is confirmed.

2. resolved Sep 16, 2026, 10:15 AM UTC

   The incident affecting Bitbucket Pipelines has been fully resolved and the pipeline backlog has cleared. Pipeline scheduling and build executions are now operating normally. Note: If you have any older builds that were queued or stalled during the incident window and did not automatically resume, please re-run or trigger a new build.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 14, 2026, 04:46 PM UTC· resolved Sep 14, 2026, 05:43 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 14, 2026, 04:46 PM UTC

   We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting Opsgenie and Jira Service Management. We will share updates here as more information is available.

2. identified Sep 14, 2026, 05:16 PM UTC

   We have identified the likely cause of the issue, and our teams are diligently working on a mitigation. We will continue to share additional updates here as more information is available.

3. monitoring Sep 14, 2026, 05:27 PM UTC

   The issue has now been resolved, and services are operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

4. resolved Sep 14, 2026, 05:43 PM UTC

   On September 14, 2026, Opsgenie and Jira Service Management experienced a disruption, and impacted users saw delayed alerts notification and inability to view the alerts in the user interface. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. postmortem Sep 18, 2026, 05:02 PM UTC

   ### Summary On September 14, 2026, between 15:30 and 17:10 UTC, Atlassian customers using Opsgenie, Jira Service Management, and Compass experienced delays in receiving alert notifications and intermittent failures when using Ops features. The issue was triggered by long-running transactions in a core service, which led to thread pool exhaustion and caused subsequent requests to become unresponsive. The long-running transactions were caused by a configuration change released between September 9, 2026 and September 11, 2026 UTC. The team actively monitored the impact of the change on the system until early September 14, 2026 UTC, and observed no anomalies. However, increasing traffic during US working hours on September 14, 2026, caused these unexpectedly long-running transactions. The incident was detected within one minute by our automated monitoring systems, and full service stabilization occurred after isolating and rolling back the change on September 14, 2026 at 17:10 UTC. ### IMPACT The incident primarily affected Ops features across Opsgenie, Jira Service Management, and Compass for customers hosted in the US region. During the incident, the end-to-end flow for alert creation and notification delivery experienced an average delay of 22 minutes. No alerts or notification payloads were dropped during the incident; all queued events were successfully processed and delivered as services recovered. Additionally, related Ops API endpoints and Web UI flows experienced elevated latency and intermittent errors. The disruption began at 15:30 UTC and was resolved by 17:10 UTC (total duration: 1 hour and 40 minutes). Engineering teams were alerted immediately via backup disaster-alerting pipelines and began mitigation without delay. However, the disruption affected internal notification and coordination flows between cross-functional teams (including Customer Support and Incident Communications), which resulted in delays in publishing external Statuspage updates. ### ROOT CAUSE The incident was triggered when a newly released configuration change made redundant downstream service calls on every page load, causing a traffic spike. The configuration change, released between September 9, 2026, and September 11, 2026, was actively monitored for impact until early September 14, 2026. However, a traffic spike during US working hours caused unexpected issues. The downstream service began rate-limiting requests, and an aggressive retry strategy without sufficient backoff held worker threads open, leading to pool exhaustion and timeouts on incoming critical traffic. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS The incident was mitigated by disabling the feature flag that triggered the inter-service rate limiting. We understand reliable access to Atlassian products is critical for your teams. We are prioritizing the following actions to prevent recurrence: - **Improve Service-to-Service Resilience** - Review and adjust rate-limiting configurations between internal services. - Optimize retry strategies to prevent long-running transactions and keep the impact isolated to problematic point. - **Improve Architectural Isolation** - Refine the architecture of this core service to have more isolation between different transactions so that degradations in one transaction type do not impact unrelated critical flows. - **Improve Proactive Alerting** - Add early-warning alerts for thread pool saturation and elevated inter-service rate-limit responses before they impact end users. - Implement backup alerting processes for customer support and incident communication paths We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 14, 2026, 04:46 PM UTC· resolved Sep 14, 2026, 05:43 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 14, 2026, 04:46 PM UTC

   We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting Opsgenie and Jira Service Management. We will share updates here as more information is available.

2. identified Sep 14, 2026, 05:16 PM UTC

   We have identified the likely cause of the issue, and our teams are diligently working on a mitigation. We will continue to share additional updates here as more information is available.

3. monitoring Sep 14, 2026, 05:27 PM UTC

   The issue has now been resolved, and services are operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

4. resolved Sep 14, 2026, 05:43 PM UTC

   On September 14, 2026, Opsgenie and Jira Service Management experienced a disruption, and impacted users saw delayed alerts notification and inability to view the alerts in the user interface. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. postmortem Sep 18, 2026, 05:02 PM UTC

   ### Summary On September 14, 2026, between 15:30 and 17:10 UTC, Atlassian customers using Opsgenie, Jira Service Management, and Compass experienced delays in receiving alert notifications and intermittent failures when using Ops features. The issue was triggered by long-running transactions in a core service, which led to thread pool exhaustion and caused subsequent requests to become unresponsive. The long-running transactions were caused by a configuration change released between September 9, 2026 and September 11, 2026 UTC. The team actively monitored the impact of the change on the system until early September 14, 2026 UTC, and observed no anomalies. However, increasing traffic during US working hours on September 14, 2026, caused these unexpectedly long-running transactions. The incident was detected within one minute by our automated monitoring systems, and full service stabilization occurred after isolating and rolling back the change on September 14, 2026 at 17:10 UTC. ### IMPACT The incident primarily affected Ops features across Opsgenie, Jira Service Management, and Compass for customers hosted in the US region. During the incident, the end-to-end flow for alert creation and notification delivery experienced an average delay of 22 minutes. No alerts or notification payloads were dropped during the incident; all queued events were successfully processed and delivered as services recovered. Additionally, related Ops API endpoints and Web UI flows experienced elevated latency and intermittent errors. The disruption began at 15:30 UTC and was resolved by 17:10 UTC (total duration: 1 hour and 40 minutes). Engineering teams were alerted immediately via backup disaster-alerting pipelines and began mitigation without delay. However, the disruption affected internal notification and coordination flows between cross-functional teams (including Customer Support and Incident Communications), which resulted in delays in publishing external Statuspage updates. ### ROOT CAUSE The incident was triggered when a newly released configuration change made redundant downstream service calls on every page load, causing a traffic spike. The configuration change, released between September 9, 2026, and September 11, 2026, was actively monitored for impact until early September 14, 2026. However, a traffic spike during US working hours caused unexpected issues. The downstream service began rate-limiting requests, and an aggressive retry strategy without sufficient backoff held worker threads open, leading to pool exhaustion and timeouts on incoming critical traffic. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS The incident was mitigated by disabling the feature flag that triggered the inter-service rate limiting. We understand reliable access to Atlassian products is critical for your teams. We are prioritizing the following actions to prevent recurrence: - **Improve Service-to-Service Resilience** - Review and adjust rate-limiting configurations between internal services. - Optimize retry strategies to prevent long-running transactions and keep the impact isolated to problematic point. - **Improve Architectural Isolation** - Refine the architecture of this core service to have more isolation between different transactions so that degradations in one transaction type do not impact unrelated critical flows. - **Improve Proactive Alerting** - Add early-warning alerts for thread pool saturation and elevated inter-service rate-limit responses before they impact end users. - Implement backup alerting processes for customer support and incident communication paths We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 14, 2026, 04:46 PM UTC· resolved Sep 14, 2026, 05:43 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 14, 2026, 04:46 PM UTC

   We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting Opsgenie and Jira Service Management. We will share updates here as more information is available.

2. identified Sep 14, 2026, 05:16 PM UTC

   We have identified the likely cause of the issue, and our teams are diligently working on a mitigation. We will continue to share additional updates here as more information is available.

3. monitoring Sep 14, 2026, 05:27 PM UTC

   The issue has now been resolved, and services are operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor closely to confirm stability.

4. resolved Sep 14, 2026, 05:43 PM UTC

   On September 14, 2026, Opsgenie and Jira Service Management experienced a disruption, and impacted users saw delayed alerts notification and inability to view the alerts in the user interface. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

5. postmortem Sep 18, 2026, 05:02 PM UTC

   ### Summary On September 14, 2026, between 15:30 and 17:10 UTC, Atlassian customers using Opsgenie, Jira Service Management, and Compass experienced delays in receiving alert notifications and intermittent failures when using Ops features. The issue was triggered by long-running transactions in a core service, which led to thread pool exhaustion and caused subsequent requests to become unresponsive. The long-running transactions were caused by a configuration change released between September 9, 2026 and September 11, 2026 UTC. The team actively monitored the impact of the change on the system until early September 14, 2026 UTC, and observed no anomalies. However, increasing traffic during US working hours on September 14, 2026, caused these unexpectedly long-running transactions. The incident was detected within one minute by our automated monitoring systems, and full service stabilization occurred after isolating and rolling back the change on September 14, 2026 at 17:10 UTC. ### IMPACT The incident primarily affected Ops features across Opsgenie, Jira Service Management, and Compass for customers hosted in the US region. During the incident, the end-to-end flow for alert creation and notification delivery experienced an average delay of 22 minutes. No alerts or notification payloads were dropped during the incident; all queued events were successfully processed and delivered as services recovered. Additionally, related Ops API endpoints and Web UI flows experienced elevated latency and intermittent errors. The disruption began at 15:30 UTC and was resolved by 17:10 UTC (total duration: 1 hour and 40 minutes). Engineering teams were alerted immediately via backup disaster-alerting pipelines and began mitigation without delay. However, the disruption affected internal notification and coordination flows between cross-functional teams (including Customer Support and Incident Communications), which resulted in delays in publishing external Statuspage updates. ### ROOT CAUSE The incident was triggered when a newly released configuration change made redundant downstream service calls on every page load, causing a traffic spike. The configuration change, released between September 9, 2026, and September 11, 2026, was actively monitored for impact until early September 14, 2026. However, a traffic spike during US working hours caused unexpected issues. The downstream service began rate-limiting requests, and an aggressive retry strategy without sufficient backoff held worker threads open, leading to pool exhaustion and timeouts on incoming critical traffic. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS The incident was mitigated by disabling the feature flag that triggered the inter-service rate limiting. We understand reliable access to Atlassian products is critical for your teams. We are prioritizing the following actions to prevent recurrence: - **Improve Service-to-Service Resilience** - Review and adjust rate-limiting configurations between internal services. - Optimize retry strategies to prevent long-running transactions and keep the impact isolated to problematic point. - **Improve Architectural Isolation** - Refine the architecture of this core service to have more isolation between different transactions so that degradations in one transaction type do not impact unrelated critical flows. - **Improve Proactive Alerting** - Add early-warning alerts for thread pool saturation and elevated inter-service rate-limit responses before they impact end users. - Implement backup alerting processes for customer support and incident communication paths We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 11, 2026, 07:46 AM UTC· resolved Sep 11, 2026, 08:37 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 11, 2026, 07:46 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of an issue affecting Jira Software and Jira Service Management. Affected users may experience errors or delays when loading issue views and viewing boards. We are working to identify the root cause and will provide an update as more information becomes available.

2. monitoring Sep 11, 2026, 08:06 AM UTC

   A mitigation has been deployed, and we are observing recovery across Jira Software and Jira Service Management issue views and boards. Our engineering teams are closely monitoring the environment to ensure sustained stability. We will provide another update once full resolution is confirmed or within 60 minutes.

3. resolved Sep 11, 2026, 08:37 AM UTC

   On 11 September 2026, Between 07:02 UTC and 07:56 UTC, some Jira Software and Jira Service Management users may have experienced degraded performance and errors when accessing Work Items and Boards. The issue has now been resolved, and all services are operating normally.

4. postmortem Sep 21, 2026, 10:36 PM UTC

   ### Summary On September 11, 2026, between 07:02 and 07:56 UTC, Atlassian customers primarily from the EU region and some from APAC region using Jira and Jira Service Management products were unable to view work items or access boards consistently. The event was triggered by a backward-incompatible internal configuration rollout in the underlying graph data platform. The incident was detected within 3 minutes by our automated monitoring system and mitigated by rolling forward the stable deployment to all regions. The total time to resolution was about 54 minutes. ### IMPACT The overall impact occurred between September 11, 2026, 07:02 UTC and September 11, 2026, 07:56 UTC on two products. During this period, some customers in the EU region using Jira and Jira Service Management experienced intermittent failures or degraded performance. We noted that a configuration failure prevented critical dependency services from scaling, which resulted in an outage for affected users. Jira and Jira Service Management users experienced timeout errors and failed or delayed page loads when attempting to access the work item view, issue navigator, and board view. ### ROOT CAUSE The incident was caused by the deployment of a change to the graph store service, which serves links to third-party entities such as pull requests. The change caused startup checks to fail, preventing new nodes from joining the cluster. During peak traffic, the service could not scale sufficiently, causing requests from Jira and Jira Service Management to the graph store service to fail. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS We know that outages impact your productivity. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to avoid repeating this type of incident: - Implement Code-Based Configuration: We are moving configuration definition files to be part of the core codebase to ensure they are versioned and deployed synchronously with the application logic. - Graceful Degradation in Jira: We are implementing changes to the affected Jira views to segregate core queries from noncritical dependency queries, allowing the page to remain functional even if a downstream service fails. - Optimize Deployment Pipeline: Deployment pipelines are being optimized to enable accelerated, parallel updates during operational response scenarios. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 11, 2026, 07:46 AM UTC· resolved Sep 11, 2026, 08:37 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 11, 2026, 07:46 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of an issue affecting Jira Software and Jira Service Management. Affected users may experience errors or delays when loading issue views and viewing boards. We are working to identify the root cause and will provide an update as more information becomes available.

2. monitoring Sep 11, 2026, 08:06 AM UTC

   A mitigation has been deployed, and we are observing recovery across Jira Software and Jira Service Management issue views and boards. Our engineering teams are closely monitoring the environment to ensure sustained stability. We will provide another update once full resolution is confirmed or within 60 minutes.

3. resolved Sep 11, 2026, 08:37 AM UTC

   On 11 September 2026, Between 07:02 UTC and 07:56 UTC, some Jira Software and Jira Service Management users may have experienced degraded performance and errors when accessing Work Items and Boards. The issue has now been resolved, and all services are operating normally.

4. postmortem Sep 21, 2026, 10:36 PM UTC

   ### Summary On September 11, 2026, between 07:02 and 07:56 UTC, Atlassian customers primarily from the EU region and some from APAC region using Jira and Jira Service Management products were unable to view work items or access boards consistently. The event was triggered by a backward-incompatible internal configuration rollout in the underlying graph data platform. The incident was detected within 3 minutes by our automated monitoring system and mitigated by rolling forward the stable deployment to all regions. The total time to resolution was about 54 minutes. ### IMPACT The overall impact occurred between September 11, 2026, 07:02 UTC and September 11, 2026, 07:56 UTC on two products. During this period, some customers in the EU region using Jira and Jira Service Management experienced intermittent failures or degraded performance. We noted that a configuration failure prevented critical dependency services from scaling, which resulted in an outage for affected users. Jira and Jira Service Management users experienced timeout errors and failed or delayed page loads when attempting to access the work item view, issue navigator, and board view. ### ROOT CAUSE The incident was caused by the deployment of a change to the graph store service, which serves links to third-party entities such as pull requests. The change caused startup checks to fail, preventing new nodes from joining the cluster. During peak traffic, the service could not scale sufficiently, causing requests from Jira and Jira Service Management to the graph store service to fail. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS We know that outages impact your productivity. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to avoid repeating this type of incident: - Implement Code-Based Configuration: We are moving configuration definition files to be part of the core codebase to ensure they are versioned and deployed synchronously with the application logic. - Graceful Degradation in Jira: We are implementing changes to the affected Jira views to segregate core queries from noncritical dependency queries, allowing the page to remain functional even if a downstream service fails. - Optimize Deployment Pipeline: Deployment pipelines are being optimized to enable accelerated, parallel updates during operational response scenarios. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 11, 2026, 07:46 AM UTC· resolved Sep 11, 2026, 08:37 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 11, 2026, 07:46 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of an issue affecting Jira Software and Jira Service Management. Affected users may experience errors or delays when loading issue views and viewing boards. We are working to identify the root cause and will provide an update as more information becomes available.

2. monitoring Sep 11, 2026, 08:06 AM UTC

   A mitigation has been deployed, and we are observing recovery across Jira Software and Jira Service Management issue views and boards. Our engineering teams are closely monitoring the environment to ensure sustained stability. We will provide another update once full resolution is confirmed or within 60 minutes.

3. resolved Sep 11, 2026, 08:37 AM UTC

   On 11 September 2026, Between 07:02 UTC and 07:56 UTC, some Jira Software and Jira Service Management users may have experienced degraded performance and errors when accessing Work Items and Boards. The issue has now been resolved, and all services are operating normally.

4. postmortem Sep 21, 2026, 10:36 PM UTC

   ### Summary On September 11, 2026, between 07:02 and 07:56 UTC, Atlassian customers primarily from the EU region and some from APAC region using Jira and Jira Service Management products were unable to view work items or access boards consistently. The event was triggered by a backward-incompatible internal configuration rollout in the underlying graph data platform. The incident was detected within 3 minutes by our automated monitoring system and mitigated by rolling forward the stable deployment to all regions. The total time to resolution was about 54 minutes. ### IMPACT The overall impact occurred between September 11, 2026, 07:02 UTC and September 11, 2026, 07:56 UTC on two products. During this period, some customers in the EU region using Jira and Jira Service Management experienced intermittent failures or degraded performance. We noted that a configuration failure prevented critical dependency services from scaling, which resulted in an outage for affected users. Jira and Jira Service Management users experienced timeout errors and failed or delayed page loads when attempting to access the work item view, issue navigator, and board view. ### ROOT CAUSE The incident was caused by the deployment of a change to the graph store service, which serves links to third-party entities such as pull requests. The change caused startup checks to fail, preventing new nodes from joining the cluster. During peak traffic, the service could not scale sufficiently, causing requests from Jira and Jira Service Management to the graph store service to fail. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS We know that outages impact your productivity. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to avoid repeating this type of incident: - Implement Code-Based Configuration: We are moving configuration definition files to be part of the core codebase to ensure they are versioned and deployed synchronously with the application logic. - Graceful Degradation in Jira: We are implementing changes to the affected Jira views to segregate core queries from noncritical dependency queries, allowing the page to remain functional even if a downstream service fails. - Optimize Deployment Pipeline: Deployment pipelines are being optimized to enable accelerated, parallel updates during operational response scenarios. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 11, 2026, 06:31 AM UTC· resolved Sep 11, 2026, 08:00 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 11, 2026, 06:31 AM UTC

   Bitbucket Cloud is experiencing an intermittent reliability issue affecting some users. The issue is impacting pull requests, commits view, related Bitbucket pages, and some Pipelines activity. Users may see pages fail to load, time out, or continue spinning without completing. We will provide further updates within an hour, or sooner if we have significant progress to share.

2. monitoring Sep 11, 2026, 07:27 AM UTC

   We have identified the root cause of this incident and taken corrective steps to address it, with some improvements observed. We continue to monitor the situation to ensure stability.

3. resolved Sep 11, 2026, 08:00 AM UTC

   On September 11 2026, between 5:30 UTC and 6:45 UTC, users experienced intermittent reliability issue that affected pull requests, commits view, related Bitbucket pages, and some Pipelines activity. Users may have also seen pages fail to load and timed out. The issue is now resolved and services have been restored to normal operation for all the affected customers.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 03, 2026, 03:57 PM UTC· resolved Sep 03, 2026, 05:02 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 03:57 PM UTC

   We are actively investigating reports of a service disruption affecting JIRA customers in US East. We will share updates here as more information is available.

2. monitoring Sep 03, 2026, 04:35 PM UTC

   Our teams have taken mitigation steps to reduce the impact and we are seeing recovery among affected customers. We continue to investigate the root cause of the issue, and will share additional updates here as more information is available.

3. resolved Sep 03, 2026, 05:02 PM UTC

   On September 3, 2026, JIRA experienced a disruption, and services were unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

4. postmortem Sep 10, 2026, 06:15 PM UTC

   ### Summary On September 3, 2026, between 14:52 and 17:02 UTC, Atlassian customers using Jira and Jira Service Management in the US-East region experienced intermittent errors and degraded access to core Jira experiences, including Rovo, viewing issues, boards, navigation, search-backed experiences, workflow-related actions. The event was triggered by a progressive rollout of a caching change in Atlassian's authorization service. The change increased cache traffic and caused saturation in the cache layer used for authorization checks, which then resulted in timeouts and service errors for some customers in the region. The incident was detected by our monitoring within approximately 12 minutes. We mitigated by deploying the affected cache service and disabling the feature flags associated with the new cache path. The total time to resolution was 2 hours and 10 minutes. ### IMPACT The overall impact occurred on September 3, 2026 between 14:52 and 17:02 UTC. During this period, some customers in the US-East region using Jira and Jira Service Management experienced intermittent failures or degraded performance when accessing experiences that depend on authorization checks. These included issue view, Rovo, board view, navigation, search-backed experiences, API, and workflow-related actions. ### ROOT CAUSE The issue was caused by a progressive rollout of a new cache path in Atlassian’s authorization service. The change was intended to improve scalability for customers with large authorization datasets by changing how some authorization information was cached. During the rollout, both the existing and new cache paths were active for consistency checks, which increased the number of cache entries and cache operations. In the US-East region, where traffic volume was highest, this additional load saturated parts of the shared cache layer. As cache requests timed out, the authorization service made more fallback requests to upstream systems, further increasing load and causing circuit breakers and timeouts. Dependent Jira experiences that require authorization checks then returned intermittent errors or failed to load for affected users. The initial rollout monitoring did not surface the risk early enough because lower-traffic regions did not show the same level of degradation and some alerts were not scoped or routed in a way that highlighted the regional cache saturation before customer impact grew. ### REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS We know that outages impact customer productivity, and we apologize to customers who were affected during this incident. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents: - **Enhance deployment safeguards:** Improve rollout practices for high-risk cache and authorization-service changes by using smaller, region-aware rollout increments and validating behavior in higher-traffic regions before broader enablement. - **Implement graceful degradation:** Evaluate graceful-degradation options for authorization checks so dependent experiences can continue working, if a cache dependency is unavailable. - **Strengthen regional telemetry and capacity monitoring:** Strengthen cache capacity and health monitoring, including regional detectors for cache CPU, memory pressure, hit rate, eviction rate, timeout rate, and connection behavior. - **Expand production-scale load testing:** Review cache design and capacity planning for authorization data so changes that increase key cardinality or cache operations are load-tested against representative production-scale traffic before rollout. - **Harden client resilience:** Review cache client timeout and reconnect behavior to reduce the risk of connection storms when cache nodes become slow or saturated. We will continue to validate these actions through the incident review process and track them to completion with the responsible engineering teams. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 03, 2026, 02:20 PM UTC· resolved Sep 03, 2026, 05:03 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 02:20 PM UTC

   We are investigating an issue impacting Jira Service Management. Affected users may experience errors or slowness when viewing or interacting with the Affected Services field. Our teams are actively investigating the root cause. We will provide the next update in the next 1 hour, or sooner.

2. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 03:20 PM UTC

   We have identified the cause of the issue affecting Jira Service Management and are currently deploying a fix. We expect to see recovery shortly and will continue to monitor the situation closely. We will provide the next update in 60 minutes, or sooner if there is a material update.

3. monitoring Sep 03, 2026, 04:15 PM UTC

   The performance degradation of Jira Service Management has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. resolved Sep 03, 2026, 05:03 PM UTC

   On September 3, 2026, some Jira Service Management users may have experienced errors viewing the Affected Services field or performance degradation on the web. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 03, 2026, 02:20 PM UTC· resolved Sep 03, 2026, 05:03 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 02:20 PM UTC

   We are investigating an issue impacting Jira Service Management. Affected users may experience errors or slowness when viewing or interacting with the Affected Services field. Our teams are actively investigating the root cause. We will provide the next update in the next 1 hour, or sooner.

2. investigating Sep 03, 2026, 03:20 PM UTC

   We have identified the cause of the issue affecting Jira Service Management and are currently deploying a fix. We expect to see recovery shortly and will continue to monitor the situation closely. We will provide the next update in 60 minutes, or sooner if there is a material update.

3. monitoring Sep 03, 2026, 04:15 PM UTC

   The performance degradation of Jira Service Management has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We'll continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

4. resolved Sep 03, 2026, 05:03 PM UTC

   On September 3, 2026, some Jira Service Management users may have experienced errors viewing the Affected Services field or performance degradation on the web. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 02, 2026, 03:09 AM UTC· resolved Sep 02, 2026, 03:17 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 02, 2026, 03:09 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports of Forge developer installation requests failing intermittently with 'InstallationRequestFailedError' message. We will share more information within the next 1 hour or sooner.

2. resolved Sep 02, 2026, 03:17 AM UTC

   We have identified the cause of the issue impacting installation requests and deployed a fix. The issue is now resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 01, 2026, 05:09 PM UTC· resolved Sep 01, 2026, 09:35 PM UTC

1. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 05:09 PM UTC

   We are actively investigating reports of performance degradation affecting forms functionality. We will share updates here as more information is available.

2. identified Sep 01, 2026, 06:27 PM UTC

   We have identified the likely cause of the issue, and our teams are diligently working on a mitigation. Affected users may experience forms not working as expected. We will continue to share additional updates here as more information is available.

3. identified Sep 01, 2026, 08:33 PM UTC

   Our teams continue to work on the mitigation. We will continue to share additional updates here as more information is available.

4. monitoring Sep 01, 2026, 09:24 PM UTC

   The performance degradation of JIRA has been resolved, and services are now operating normally for all affected customers. We will continue to monitor performance closely to confirm stability.

5. resolved Sep 01, 2026, 09:35 PM UTC

   On September 1, some JIRA users may have experienced performance degradation affecting forms functionality. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 01, 2026, 10:11 AM UTC· resolved Sep 01, 2026, 11:44 AM UTC

1. monitoring Sep 01, 2026, 10:11 AM UTC

   We have identified the root cause of the issue impacting Jira Work Item transitions and have applied a fix. We are currently seeing signs of recovery and will continue to monitor. We will provide the next update in the next 1 hour, or sooner if there is a material update.

2. resolved Sep 01, 2026, 11:44 AM UTC

   On 1st Sept 2026, between 04:22 UTC to 10:59 UTC, some Jira users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all the customers.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 01, 2026, 10:11 AM UTC· resolved Sep 01, 2026, 11:44 AM UTC

1. monitoring Sep 01, 2026, 10:11 AM UTC

   We have identified the root cause of the issue impacting Jira Work Item transitions and have applied a fix. We are currently seeing signs of recovery and will continue to monitor. We will provide the next update in the next 1 hour, or sooner if there is a material update.

2. resolved Sep 01, 2026, 11:44 AM UTC

   On 1st Sept 2026, between 04:22 UTC to 10:59 UTC, some Jira users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all the customers.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 01, 2026, 09:12 AM UTC· resolved Sep 01, 2026, 11:44 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 09:12 AM UTC

   We are aware of an issue impacting Jira Work Item transitions. Affected users may experience errors when attempting to transition issues. Our teams are actively investigating the root cause. We will provide the next update in 60 minutes, or sooner if there is a material update.

2. monitoring Sep 01, 2026, 10:11 AM UTC

   We have identified the root cause of the issue impacting Jira Work Item transitions and have applied a fix. We are currently seeing signs of recovery and will continue to monitor. We will provide the next update in the next 1 hour, or sooner if there is a material update.

3. resolved Sep 01, 2026, 11:44 AM UTC

   On 1st Sept 2026, between 04:22 UTC to 10:59 UTC, some Jira users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all the customers.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 01, 2026, 09:12 AM UTC· resolved Sep 01, 2026, 11:44 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 09:12 AM UTC

   We are aware of an issue impacting Jira Work Item transitions. Affected users may experience errors when attempting to transition issues. Our teams are actively investigating the root cause. We will provide the next update in 60 minutes, or sooner if there is a material update.

2. monitoring Sep 01, 2026, 10:11 AM UTC

   We have identified the root cause of the issue impacting Jira Work Item transitions and have applied a fix. We are currently seeing signs of recovery and will continue to monitor. We will provide the next update in the next 1 hour, or sooner if there is a material update.

3. resolved Sep 01, 2026, 11:44 AM UTC

   On 1st Sept 2026, between 04:22 UTC to 10:59 UTC, some Jira users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all the customers.

Read the full incident report →

Started Sep 01, 2026, 09:12 AM UTC· resolved Sep 01, 2026, 11:44 AM UTC

1. investigating Sep 01, 2026, 09:12 AM UTC

   We are aware of an issue impacting Jira Work Item transitions. Affected users may experience errors when attempting to transition issues. Our teams are actively investigating the root cause. We will provide the next update in 60 minutes, or sooner if there is a material update.

2. monitoring Sep 01, 2026, 10:11 AM UTC

   We have identified the root cause of the issue impacting Jira Work Item transitions and have applied a fix. We are currently seeing signs of recovery and will continue to monitor. We will provide the next update in the next 1 hour, or sooner if there is a material update.

3. resolved Sep 01, 2026, 11:44 AM UTC

   On 1st Sept 2026, between 04:22 UTC to 10:59 UTC, some Jira users may have experienced service disruptions. The issue has now been resolved and the service is operating normally for all the customers.

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 31, 2026, 06:28 PM UTC· resolved Sep 01, 2026, 05:18 AM UTC

1. identified Aug 31, 2026, 06:28 PM UTC

   Impact

2. monitoring Sep 01, 2026, 12:47 AM UTC

   Jira Incoming Emails are experiencing elevated failures when fetching mail from Microsoft accounts. This affects email-based creation and updates of Jira work items. Users may see 500 internal server errors when email fetch attempts occur. We are tracking updates from Microsoft and continuing to review the impact. These updates are available publicly via https://status.cloud.microsoft/

3. resolved Sep 01, 2026, 05:18 AM UTC

   We're now seeing full recovery across Atlassian services that have been impacted, and this incident is now resolved. For those continuing to experience issues relating to this incident we encourage you to please check https://status.cloud.microsoft/ as they continue to provide further updates about additional services.

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 27, 2026, 10:26 AM UTC· resolved Sep 03, 2026, 06:06 AM UTC

1. identified Aug 27, 2026, 10:26 AM UTC

   On August 19, 2026, we identified an issue affecting the delivery of Microsoft Teams notifications for Opsgenie standalone customers. The root cause has been identified and our teams are working with our partners to resolve this issue. This issue does not impact Jira Service Management Operations customers. We will provide the next update in 24 hours.

2. identified Aug 28, 2026, 10:38 AM UTC

   Our teams continue to work with our partners towards resolving the Microsoft Teams notification delivery issue for Opsgenie standalone customers. We will provide the next update in 72 hours or sooner if we have a material update.

3. identified Aug 31, 2026, 10:29 AM UTC

   Our teams continue to work with our partners, towards resolving the Microsoft Teams notification delivery issue for Opsgenie standalone customers. We will provide the next update in 24 hours, or sooner if there is a significant update.

4. identified Sep 01, 2026, 10:16 AM UTC

   Our teams continue to work with our partners towards resolving the Microsoft Teams notification delivery issue for Opsgenie standalone customers. We will provide the next update in 24 hours, or sooner if there is a significant update.

5. identified Sep 02, 2026, 10:17 AM UTC

   Our teams continue to work with our partners towards resolving the Microsoft Teams notification delivery issue for Opsgenie standalone customers. We will provide the next update in 24 hours, or sooner if there is a significant update.

6. resolved Sep 03, 2026, 06:06 AM UTC

   On August 19, we identified an issue affecting the delivery of Microsoft Teams notifications for Opsgenie standalone customers. The root cause was attributed to an operational error caused by our external partner, and they have taken corrective measures to restore services. If you are still experiencing issues, please follow these steps to restore your integration: https://support.atlassian.com/opsgenie/docs/restore-the-opsgenie-microsoft-teams-v2-integration/. If you require further assistance, please reach out to Atlassian Support via support.atlassian.com/contact.

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 27, 2026, 04:22 AM UTC· resolved Aug 27, 2026, 05:16 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 04:22 AM UTC

   Our teams have identified this issue is also impacting Jira Service Management. We will update further as soon as possible.

2. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 04:25 AM UTC

   We are investigating an issue with accessing products that is impacting Confluence, Jira Cloud and Jira Serivce Management customers. Our team is urgently investigating this issue and we will provide further details within one hour or sooner if information is available.

3. identified Aug 27, 2026, 04:33 AM UTC

   Our teams have identified a possible fix for the issues impacting Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence. This is now being rolled out to impacted regions and we will update within one hour, or sooner if further information is available.

4. monitoring Aug 27, 2026, 04:51 AM UTC

   The issues relating to loading Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence are now in recovery. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability and provide an update within one hour, or sooner as more information becomes available.

5. resolved Aug 27, 2026, 05:16 AM UTC

   On 27 August 2026 UTC, Atlassian products including Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence experienced a disruption, and services were unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers. A public postmortem for this incident will be made available on this page when our full investigation of the incident has been completed.

6. postmortem Sep 07, 2026, 02:53 AM UTC

   **SUMMARY** On August 27, 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC, Atlassian customers in the Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions were unable to reach Atlassian Cloud products, including Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The event was triggered by a defective code change to the routing layer of one of our proxy fleets. This led to HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. The incident was detected within 1 minute by our automated monitoring systems, and mitigated by rolling back to the previous configuration release, which put the proxy fleet into a known good state. After the proxy fleet recovered, some Jira and Confluence customers (regardless of location) received HTTP 503 errors between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC as server fleets adjusted to the influx of traffic. **IMPACT** The overall impact was split into two discrete periods: - First, on 27 August 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC on Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The incident caused service disruption to customer traffic originating from Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions, with HTTP 404 errors returned. There was no impact to customer API traffic, regardless of origin location. - Second, on 27 August 2026, between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC, some Jira and Confluence customers regardless of location received HTTP 503 errors after the HTTP 404 errors were solved: ~32% of requests in ap-southeast-2, ~4% of requests in eu-west-1, ~2.5% of requests in us-west-2 and ap-southeast-1, and <1% of requests in all remaining global regions. **ROOT CAUSE** The event was triggered by a code change to one of our proxy fleets. However, there was a defect in the code deployed which was not detected by manual and automated testing. This led to a misconfiguration of a tenant lookup functionality in the proxy tier, which led to traffic not having a valid network path, resulting in HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. After the proxy tier impact recovered, a second period of impact was caused to some Jira and Confluence customers. Due to the reduction of traffic served to Jira and Confluence by the proxy fleet, the Jira and Confluence service tiers had automatically scaled in the number of servers serving customer traffic. Once the proxy fleet functionality was restored, the surge of traffic overwhelmed the Jira service tier, which returned an elevated rate of HTTP 503s until it automatically scaled out again. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn’t identified because the change was related to a very specific kind of edge case that was not picked up by our automated continuous deployment suites and manual test scripts. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help avoid repeating this type of incident: - **Adding further deployment safeguards:** The deployment pipeline for the configuration of the impacted proxy tier was using a legacy system and did not have the appropriate slow regional rollout features configured correctly. We have already added the correct safeguards, and we are moving this to our company standard deployment pipeline that includes all of our safety controls enabled by default. We are also auditing all networking services to validate that they are all on the new standard pipeline deployment service. - **Enhancing service fleet scaling policies:** The auto scaling configuration for our Jira and Confluence service fleets was configured to scale in too aggressively. We are thoroughly reviewing and updating all of the complex Jira and Confluence auto scaling policies to ensure that this doesn’t occur again. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 27, 2026, 04:22 AM UTC· resolved Aug 27, 2026, 05:16 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 04:22 AM UTC

   Our teams have identified this issue is also impacting Jira Service Management. We will update further as soon as possible.

2. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 04:25 AM UTC

   We are investigating an issue with accessing products that is impacting Confluence, Jira Cloud and Jira Serivce Management customers. Our team is urgently investigating this issue and we will provide further details within one hour or sooner if information is available.

3. identified Aug 27, 2026, 04:33 AM UTC

   Our teams have identified a possible fix for the issues impacting Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence. This is now being rolled out to impacted regions and we will update within one hour, or sooner if further information is available.

4. monitoring Aug 27, 2026, 04:51 AM UTC

   The issues relating to loading Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence are now in recovery. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability and provide an update within one hour, or sooner as more information becomes available.

5. resolved Aug 27, 2026, 05:16 AM UTC

   On 27 August 2026 UTC, Atlassian products including Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence experienced a disruption, and services were unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers. A public postmortem for this incident will be made available on this page when our full investigation of the incident has been completed.

6. postmortem Sep 07, 2026, 02:53 AM UTC

   **SUMMARY** On August 27, 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC, Atlassian customers in the Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions were unable to reach Atlassian Cloud products, including Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The event was triggered by a defective code change to the routing layer of one of our proxy fleets. This led to HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. The incident was detected within 1 minute by our automated monitoring systems, and mitigated by rolling back to the previous configuration release, which put the proxy fleet into a known good state. After the proxy fleet recovered, some Jira and Confluence customers (regardless of location) received HTTP 503 errors between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC as server fleets adjusted to the influx of traffic. **IMPACT** The overall impact was split into two discrete periods: - First, on 27 August 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC on Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The incident caused service disruption to customer traffic originating from Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions, with HTTP 404 errors returned. There was no impact to customer API traffic, regardless of origin location. - Second, on 27 August 2026, between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC, some Jira and Confluence customers regardless of location received HTTP 503 errors after the HTTP 404 errors were solved: ~32% of requests in ap-southeast-2, ~4% of requests in eu-west-1, ~2.5% of requests in us-west-2 and ap-southeast-1, and <1% of requests in all remaining global regions. **ROOT CAUSE** The event was triggered by a code change to one of our proxy fleets. However, there was a defect in the code deployed which was not detected by manual and automated testing. This led to a misconfiguration of a tenant lookup functionality in the proxy tier, which led to traffic not having a valid network path, resulting in HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. After the proxy tier impact recovered, a second period of impact was caused to some Jira and Confluence customers. Due to the reduction of traffic served to Jira and Confluence by the proxy fleet, the Jira and Confluence service tiers had automatically scaled in the number of servers serving customer traffic. Once the proxy fleet functionality was restored, the surge of traffic overwhelmed the Jira service tier, which returned an elevated rate of HTTP 503s until it automatically scaled out again. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn’t identified because the change was related to a very specific kind of edge case that was not picked up by our automated continuous deployment suites and manual test scripts. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help avoid repeating this type of incident: - **Adding further deployment safeguards:** The deployment pipeline for the configuration of the impacted proxy tier was using a legacy system and did not have the appropriate slow regional rollout features configured correctly. We have already added the correct safeguards, and we are moving this to our company standard deployment pipeline that includes all of our safety controls enabled by default. We are also auditing all networking services to validate that they are all on the new standard pipeline deployment service. - **Enhancing service fleet scaling policies:** The auto scaling configuration for our Jira and Confluence service fleets was configured to scale in too aggressively. We are thoroughly reviewing and updating all of the complex Jira and Confluence auto scaling policies to ensure that this doesn’t occur again. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 27, 2026, 04:22 AM UTC· resolved Aug 27, 2026, 05:16 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 04:22 AM UTC

   Our teams have identified this issue is also impacting Jira Service Management. We will update further as soon as possible.

2. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 04:25 AM UTC

   We are investigating an issue with accessing products that is impacting Confluence, Jira Cloud and Jira Serivce Management customers. Our team is urgently investigating this issue and we will provide further details within one hour or sooner if information is available.

3. identified Aug 27, 2026, 04:33 AM UTC

   Our teams have identified a possible fix for the issues impacting Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence. This is now being rolled out to impacted regions and we will update within one hour, or sooner if further information is available.

4. monitoring Aug 27, 2026, 04:51 AM UTC

   The issues relating to loading Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence are now in recovery. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability and provide an update within one hour, or sooner as more information becomes available.

5. resolved Aug 27, 2026, 05:16 AM UTC

   On 27 August 2026 UTC, Atlassian products including Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence experienced a disruption, and services were unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers. A public postmortem for this incident will be made available on this page when our full investigation of the incident has been completed.

6. postmortem Sep 07, 2026, 02:53 AM UTC

   **SUMMARY** On August 27, 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC, Atlassian customers in the Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions were unable to reach Atlassian Cloud products, including Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The event was triggered by a defective code change to the routing layer of one of our proxy fleets. This led to HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. The incident was detected within 1 minute by our automated monitoring systems, and mitigated by rolling back to the previous configuration release, which put the proxy fleet into a known good state. After the proxy fleet recovered, some Jira and Confluence customers (regardless of location) received HTTP 503 errors between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC as server fleets adjusted to the influx of traffic. **IMPACT** The overall impact was split into two discrete periods: - First, on 27 August 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC on Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The incident caused service disruption to customer traffic originating from Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions, with HTTP 404 errors returned. There was no impact to customer API traffic, regardless of origin location. - Second, on 27 August 2026, between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC, some Jira and Confluence customers regardless of location received HTTP 503 errors after the HTTP 404 errors were solved: ~32% of requests in ap-southeast-2, ~4% of requests in eu-west-1, ~2.5% of requests in us-west-2 and ap-southeast-1, and <1% of requests in all remaining global regions. **ROOT CAUSE** The event was triggered by a code change to one of our proxy fleets. However, there was a defect in the code deployed which was not detected by manual and automated testing. This led to a misconfiguration of a tenant lookup functionality in the proxy tier, which led to traffic not having a valid network path, resulting in HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. After the proxy tier impact recovered, a second period of impact was caused to some Jira and Confluence customers. Due to the reduction of traffic served to Jira and Confluence by the proxy fleet, the Jira and Confluence service tiers had automatically scaled in the number of servers serving customer traffic. Once the proxy fleet functionality was restored, the surge of traffic overwhelmed the Jira service tier, which returned an elevated rate of HTTP 503s until it automatically scaled out again. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn’t identified because the change was related to a very specific kind of edge case that was not picked up by our automated continuous deployment suites and manual test scripts. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help avoid repeating this type of incident: - **Adding further deployment safeguards:** The deployment pipeline for the configuration of the impacted proxy tier was using a legacy system and did not have the appropriate slow regional rollout features configured correctly. We have already added the correct safeguards, and we are moving this to our company standard deployment pipeline that includes all of our safety controls enabled by default. We are also auditing all networking services to validate that they are all on the new standard pipeline deployment service. - **Enhancing service fleet scaling policies:** The auto scaling configuration for our Jira and Confluence service fleets was configured to scale in too aggressively. We are thoroughly reviewing and updating all of the complex Jira and Confluence auto scaling policies to ensure that this doesn’t occur again. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 27, 2026, 04:22 AM UTC· resolved Aug 27, 2026, 05:16 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 04:22 AM UTC

   Our teams have identified this issue is also impacting Jira Service Management. We will update further as soon as possible.

2. investigating Aug 27, 2026, 04:25 AM UTC

   We are investigating an issue with accessing products that is impacting Confluence, Jira Cloud and Jira Serivce Management customers. Our team is urgently investigating this issue and we will provide further details within one hour or sooner if information is available.

3. identified Aug 27, 2026, 04:33 AM UTC

   Our teams have identified a possible fix for the issues impacting Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence. This is now being rolled out to impacted regions and we will update within one hour, or sooner if further information is available.

4. monitoring Aug 27, 2026, 04:51 AM UTC

   The issues relating to loading Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence are now in recovery. We'll continue to monitor closely to confirm stability and provide an update within one hour, or sooner as more information becomes available.

5. resolved Aug 27, 2026, 05:16 AM UTC

   On 27 August 2026 UTC, Atlassian products including Jira Cloud, Jira Service Management and Confluence experienced a disruption, and services were unavailable to affected users. The issue has now been resolved, and the service is operating normally for all affected customers. A public postmortem for this incident will be made available on this page when our full investigation of the incident has been completed.

6. postmortem Sep 07, 2026, 02:53 AM UTC

   **SUMMARY** On August 27, 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC, Atlassian customers in the Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions were unable to reach Atlassian Cloud products, including Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The event was triggered by a defective code change to the routing layer of one of our proxy fleets. This led to HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. The incident was detected within 1 minute by our automated monitoring systems, and mitigated by rolling back to the previous configuration release, which put the proxy fleet into a known good state. After the proxy fleet recovered, some Jira and Confluence customers (regardless of location) received HTTP 503 errors between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC as server fleets adjusted to the influx of traffic. **IMPACT** The overall impact was split into two discrete periods: - First, on 27 August 2026, between 03:51 and 04:35 UTC on Atlassian Analytics, Compass, Confluence, Focus, Guard, Jira, JPD, JSM, Opsgenie, Rovo Search, and Talent. The incident caused service disruption to customer traffic originating from Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions, with HTTP 404 errors returned. There was no impact to customer API traffic, regardless of origin location. - Second, on 27 August 2026, between 04:33 and 04:53 UTC, some Jira and Confluence customers regardless of location received HTTP 503 errors after the HTTP 404 errors were solved: ~32% of requests in ap-southeast-2, ~4% of requests in eu-west-1, ~2.5% of requests in us-west-2 and ap-southeast-1, and <1% of requests in all remaining global regions. **ROOT CAUSE** The event was triggered by a code change to one of our proxy fleets. However, there was a defect in the code deployed which was not detected by manual and automated testing. This led to a misconfiguration of a tenant lookup functionality in the proxy tier, which led to traffic not having a valid network path, resulting in HTTP 404 errors being served to all customer traffic through these proxy fleets in Western Europe and Southeast APAC regions. After the proxy tier impact recovered, a second period of impact was caused to some Jira and Confluence customers. Due to the reduction of traffic served to Jira and Confluence by the proxy fleet, the Jira and Confluence service tiers had automatically scaled in the number of servers serving customer traffic. Once the proxy fleet functionality was restored, the surge of traffic overwhelmed the Jira service tier, which returned an elevated rate of HTTP 503s until it automatically scaled out again. **REMEDIAL ACTIONS PLAN & NEXT STEPS** We know that outages impact your productivity. While we have a number of testing and preventative processes in place, this specific issue wasn’t identified because the change was related to a very specific kind of edge case that was not picked up by our automated continuous deployment suites and manual test scripts. We are prioritizing the following improvement actions to help avoid repeating this type of incident: - **Adding further deployment safeguards:** The deployment pipeline for the configuration of the impacted proxy tier was using a legacy system and did not have the appropriate slow regional rollout features configured correctly. We have already added the correct safeguards, and we are moving this to our company standard deployment pipeline that includes all of our safety controls enabled by default. We are also auditing all networking services to validate that they are all on the new standard pipeline deployment service. - **Enhancing service fleet scaling policies:** The auto scaling configuration for our Jira and Confluence service fleets was configured to scale in too aggressively. We are thoroughly reviewing and updating all of the complex Jira and Confluence auto scaling policies to ensure that this doesn’t occur again. We apologize to customers whose services were impacted during this incident; we are taking immediate steps to improve the platform’s performance and availability. Thanks, Atlassian Customer Support

Read the full incident report →

Started Aug 25, 2026, 10:58 AM UTC· resolved Aug 25, 2026, 11:11 AM UTC

1. monitoring Aug 25, 2026, 10:58 AM UTC

   A fix has been successfully deployed for the issue affecting scheduled triggers (5-minute intervals) for some Marketplace apps. We continue to monitor the situation and should be fully recovered soon. We should be able to provide more updates in the one hour.

2. resolved Aug 25, 2026, 11:11 AM UTC

   On Aug 25th, 2026, between 08:12 UTC and 11:03 UTC, some Marketplace apps may have experienced scheduled triggers (5-minute intervals) not firing as expected. The issue has now been resolved and the 5-minute scheduled triggers are operating normally for all customers.

Read the full incident report →