Red Sift UK Outage History

Started Aug 15, 2026, 11:32 AM UTC· resolved Aug 17, 2026, 10:45 AM UTC

1. investigating Aug 15, 2026, 11:32 AM UTC

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. identified Aug 15, 2026, 11:52 AM UTC

   The issue has been isolated and mitigations are being implemented.

3. monitoring Aug 15, 2026, 12:04 PM UTC

   Mitigations are in place. We are monitoring the results.

4. monitoring Aug 15, 2026, 12:04 PM UTC

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

5. resolved Aug 17, 2026, 10:45 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Aug 03, 2026, 02:35 PM UTC· resolved Aug 03, 2026, 05:11 PM UTC

1. identified Aug 03, 2026, 02:35 PM UTC

   Customers on our UK-hosted environment may experience intermittent issues accessing the Red Sift platform, including the dashboard and API. We've identified the cause and are working on mitigation. No action is required on your end.

2. monitoring Aug 03, 2026, 03:09 PM UTC

   We've applied a mitigation for the intermittent access issues affecting the Red Sift platform (UI and API) on our UK-hosted environment. Access has stabilized and we're continuing to monitor. No action is required on your end. We'll post a final update once we've confirmed the issue is fully resolved.

3. monitoring Aug 03, 2026, 03:25 PM UTC

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

4. resolved Aug 03, 2026, 05:11 PM UTC

   This incident is now resolved. Access to the Red Sift platform (UI and API) on our UK-hosted environment has been stable for over an hour. No action is required on your end.

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Started Jul 13, 2026, 09:36 PM UTC· resolved Jul 13, 2026, 10:06 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 13, 2026, 09:36 PM UTC

   We are aware that customers trying to login using SSO are encountering problems. We are looking into it and will have an update as soon as we have more information.

2. investigating Jul 13, 2026, 09:56 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. monitoring Jul 13, 2026, 09:56 PM UTC

   A fix has been implemented and we are monitoring the results.

4. resolved Jul 13, 2026, 10:06 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Jun 03, 2026, 12:38 AM UTC· resolved Jun 03, 2026, 01:33 AM UTC

1. investigating Jun 03, 2026, 12:38 AM UTC

   Some customers are currently experiencing issues logging in and using our services. We are investigating

2. investigating Jun 03, 2026, 12:38 AM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. identified Jun 03, 2026, 01:09 AM UTC

   The issue has been identified and a fix is being implemented.

4. monitoring Jun 03, 2026, 01:24 AM UTC

   A fix has been implemented. Services are coming back. We are monitoring.

5. resolved Jun 03, 2026, 01:33 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

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Started Apr 23, 2026, 10:31 AM UTC· resolved Apr 23, 2026, 11:01 AM UTC

1. investigating Apr 23, 2026, 10:31 AM UTC

   We are aware that customers trying to login using SSO are encountering problems. We are looking into it and will have an update as soon as we have more information.

2. investigating Apr 23, 2026, 10:33 AM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. investigating Apr 23, 2026, 10:34 AM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

4. resolved Apr 23, 2026, 11:01 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

5. postmortem May 19, 2026, 01:27 PM UTC

   ## Incident Report – Microsoft SSO Login Disruption ### Summary On April 23, 2026, we experienced an incident affecting customers using “Sign in with Microsoft” authentication. During the incident window, some users were unable to authenticate into the platform using Microsoft SSO and received login-related authentication errors. ### Impact Customers using Microsoft SSO authentication experienced login failures across all production data centres, including UK, EU, and US environments. Other authentication methods, including Google SSO, were not impacted. ### Timeline \(CEST\) * 10:46 – Initial customer reports received regarding Microsoft SSO login failures. * 11:00–12:20 – Additional reports confirmed the issue was affecting multiple customers and environments. * 12:24 – Internal incident declared and status page updated. * 12:54 – Engineering team identified and resolved the root cause. * 13:03 – Incident confirmed resolved and status page returned to operational status. ### Root Cause The incident was caused by an expired secret associated with the production Microsoft authentication application configuration used for Microsoft SSO login flows. ### Resolution The expired secret was renewed and the authentication configuration was updated. Following the update, Microsoft SSO login functionality was restored and validated across affected environments. ### Preventive Actions To reduce the likelihood of recurrence, we are implementing the following actions: * Improved monitoring and alerting for authentication credential expiration. * Review and automation of secret rotation processes. * Additional operational checks around third-party authentication dependencies. We apologize for the disruption and appreciate customers’ patience while the issue was investigated and resolved.

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Started Jan 09, 2026, 10:45 AM UTC· resolved Jan 09, 2026, 11:21 AM UTC

1. identified Jan 09, 2026, 10:45 AM UTC

   We are experiencing connectivity issues with an upstream infrastructure provider affecting some functionality. Current impact on Brand Trust: - Management of faces and logos is unavailable - Activity page may take significantly longer to load (up to 60 seconds) We have escalated to the provider and are awaiting their response. We will post updates as we learn more.

2. monitoring Jan 09, 2026, 10:51 AM UTC

   We have implemented a fix and functionality has been restored. We are continuing to monitor and working with the upstream provider on the underlying connectivity issue.

3. resolved Jan 09, 2026, 11:21 AM UTC

   The issue has been resolved and all services are operating normally. Thank you for your patience.

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Started Aug 11, 2025, 01:48 PM UTC· resolved Aug 11, 2025, 02:38 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 11, 2025, 01:48 PM UTC

   Our cloud service provider in the UK is experiencing failures affecting service availability and performance. We are monitoring the situation and so far this has not affected our service. We continue to monitor the situation while our provider investigates it.

2. resolved Aug 11, 2025, 02:38 PM UTC

   Our provider reports that mitigation efforts are working. We will mark it as resolved and keep monitoring the situation

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Started Jul 23, 2025, 11:24 AM UTC· resolved Jul 23, 2025, 11:54 AM UTC

1. investigating Jul 23, 2025, 11:24 AM UTC

   We are currently investigating the issue with our technology partner.

2. resolved Jul 23, 2025, 11:54 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

3. postmortem Nov 28, 2025, 12:25 PM UTC

   At 11:24 UTC on 2025-07-23 our monitors detected we had stopped receiving data on the service that feeds Brand Trust lookalikes. After further investigation it was decided that this was a partial outage only, since we have other sources of data. Even further investigation confirmed that data was being received but the metrics used to monitor it were not. So while we were still processing data, we were unaware of it. The incident was closed at 11:54. There was no customer impact or no data loss.

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Started Jul 10, 2025, 11:15 AM UTC· resolved Jul 10, 2025, 11:34 AM UTC

1. investigating Jul 10, 2025, 11:15 AM UTC

   We are currently investigating this issue

2. investigating Jul 10, 2025, 11:34 AM UTC

   Our systems are back - fully operational again

3. resolved Jul 10, 2025, 11:34 AM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

4. postmortem Nov 28, 2025, 12:12 PM UTC

   # **Networking Disruption** **Date:** 10 July **Status:** Resolved On 10 July, Red Sift experienced a brief disruption affecting portions of our DNS and traffic routing infrastructure. Some customers may have observed intermittent service degradation during this period. Our investigation confirmed that the issue originated from a malfunctioning networking component on two backend systems responsible for traffic handling. As a result, network communication through these systems became unstable. Once identified, our engineering team acted immediately to restore normal operation. The affected component was restarted, and service stability returned shortly thereafter. We continued to monitor performance to ensure full recovery across all services. We can confirm that: * **All customer data remained secure and intact**, * **No configuration changes were required from customers**, and * **All impacted systems are fully operational**. As part of our ongoing commitment to reliability, we are implementing an update to the networking layer involved to mitigate the risk of recurrence. ‌ We apologise for any inconvenience this incident may have caused and remain committed to delivering a high-availability, enterprise-grade service experience. If you require further information, please reach out to your Red Sift account representative or our support team.

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Started Jul 10, 2025, 08:35 AM UTC· resolved Jul 10, 2025, 09:23 AM UTC

1. resolved Jul 10, 2025, 08:30 AM UTC

   There was an internal networking issue which briefly impact our web tools, and our API

2. postmortem Jul 10, 2025, 09:40 AM UTC

   At 08:35 UTC we detected an issue with network connectivity on 2 nodes that were part of DNS and traffic routing infrastructure which caused disruption. Further investigation revealed that on 2 of our nodes networking was unstable - e.g. packet loss, no stable DNAT and so on. The reason was identified as the overlay networking \(flannel\) which wasn't correctly set the DNAT/SNAT rules on the pods running on those nodes The monitors have been properly triggered, and the offending components identified and restarted. 9:23 UTC - all nodes were fully operational. Incident was closed.

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Started Jun 12, 2025, 05:48 PM UTC· resolved Jun 12, 2025, 07:06 PM UTC

1. investigating Jun 12, 2025, 05:48 PM UTC

   We are currently experiencing service disruptions affecting multiple systems: - User Authentication: Sign up and sign in functionality is currently unavailable - Dynamic DNS API: Experiencing elevated failure rates and intermittent connectivity issues Our engineering team is actively investigating these issues and working to restore full service as quickly as possible. We are monitoring the situation closely and implementing mitigation measures.

2. investigating Jun 12, 2025, 06:49 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. monitoring Jun 12, 2025, 07:00 PM UTC

   We are pleased to report that all affected systems are returning to normal operation: - User Authentication: Sign up and sign in functionality has been restored - Dynamic DNS API: Service levels have returned to normal with failure rates back to baseline Our monitoring indicates that all systems are now operating normally. We continue to monitor closely to ensure stability.

4. resolved Jun 12, 2025, 07:06 PM UTC

   All systems have been restored to normal operation: - User Authentication: Sign up and sign in functionality is fully operational - Dynamic DNS API: Service has returned to normal performance levels Our monitoring confirms that all affected services are now stable and operating as expected.

5. postmortem Jun 13, 2025, 01:12 PM UTC

   ## Summary On June 12, 2025, Red Sift experienced service disruptions affecting user authentication and Dynamic DNS functionality. Users were unable to sign up or sign in to the platform, and Dynamic DNS experienced elevated response times and API failures. The incident was caused by a widespread Google Cloud Platform Identity and Access Management \(IAM\) service outage that impacted multiple GCP products globally. ## Root Cause The incident was caused by a widespread Google Cloud Platform Identity and Access Management \(IAM\) service outage that began on June 12, 2025. According to [Google's incident report](https://status.cloud.google.com/incidents/ow5i3PPK96RduMcb1SsW), this affected multiple GCP products globally across all regions. Red Sift's authentication system and Dynamic DNS service \(both API and DNS components\) depend on Google Cloud Platform services that were impacted by this IAM service disruption. ## Impact ### User Authentication * 100% of sign-in and sign-up attempts failed during the incident * Existing authenticated sessions remained functional ### Dynamic DNS * DNS: 95th percentile response time increased from ~13ms to 245ms during the incident * API: Elevated failure rates and degraded performance * Both DNS resolution and API components significantly impacted ### Business Impact * New user acquisitions temporarily halted * No data loss or security breaches occurred ## Timeline All times are in BST timezone. * **18:55** - Service degradation detected * **19:02** - Root cause identified as external cloud provider issue * **19:22** - Incident declared on status page: "Partial outage due to external providers" * **20:00** - Recovery observed * **20:06** - Full service restoration confirmed ## Resolution The incident resolved automatically as Google Cloud Platform restored their IAM services. Red Sift's systems returned to normal operation without requiring any manual intervention on our infrastructure. ## Customer Impact Mitigation * Existing user sessions remained active throughout the incident * All user data and configurations remained intact * No security breaches or data loss occurred * Transparent communication provided through status page updates We sincerely apologize for any inconvenience this outage may have caused. While this incident was due to an external cloud provider issue beyond our direct control, we remain committed to providing reliable service to our customers.

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Started Jun 04, 2025, 10:34 AM UTC· resolved Jun 04, 2025, 01:12 PM UTC

1. investigating Jun 04, 2025, 10:34 AM UTC

   We have an issue with our storage system, impacting our apps and backend

2. identified Jun 04, 2025, 11:04 AM UTC

   The issue has been identified. We are investigating alternative solutions to restore some of our services

3. identified Jun 04, 2025, 11:06 AM UTC

   Services have been partially restored for Certificates and Brand Trust

4. identified Jun 04, 2025, 11:15 AM UTC

   OnDMARC application is also partially restored

5. identified Jun 04, 2025, 11:27 AM UTC

   We are continuing to work on a fix for this issue.

6. resolved Jun 04, 2025, 01:12 PM UTC

   The incident appears to have been resolved. We are operational again

7. postmortem Nov 28, 2025, 11:50 AM UTC

   # **Summary** On **2025-06-04 at 10:26**, Red Sift experienced a service outage affecting multiple products, including **Brand Trust**, **OnDMARC**, and **Certificates**. The disruption was caused by a **regional IBM Cloud storage outage in the UK**, which affected several IBM Cloud systems and dependent services. The incident led to service unavailability and degraded performance across components reliant on cloud storage. # **Root Cause** The incident was caused by a **widespread IBM Cloud storage outage in the UK region**. IBM reported failures across several of their internal systems and services, which cascaded into storage unavailability for customers in the affected region. Red Sift relies on IBM Cloud object storage and related subsystems for key operational workflows. The outage caused storage operations to fail, resulting in downstream service disruption across Brand Trust, OnDMARC, and Certificates. # **Impact** ### **Brand Trust** * Service disruptions for features dependent on cloud storage * Delayed or failed processing of certain requests ### **OnDMARC** * Inability to access or store required assets * Certain backend operations stalled or failed ### **Certificates** * Certificate processing and issuance workflows impacted * Storage operations unavailable, causing service interruptions ### **Overall Platform Impact** * Multiple services unavailable between 10:26 UTC and approximately 11:00 UTC * No data loss occurred * No security issues were observed # **Business Impact** * Temporary disruption to product functionality and customer workflows * Monitoring, processing, and certificate-related operations stalled * No permanent data integrity issues or breaches * Customer-facing reliability temporarily degraded # **Timeline** All times in UTC. * **10:26** – Alerts triggered indicating widespread storage failures * **10:26–10:40** – Investigation initiated; multiple services confirmed impacted * **10:40** – Root cause traced to external IBM Cloud storage outage * **10:45** – Mitigation efforts initiated; cloud storage dependency disabled where possible * **~11:00** – Storage systems began recovering; services starting to stabilize * **11:10** – Full service restoration observed across all affected components * **11:15** – Incident closed after confirming provider recovery and operational stability # **Resolution** Recovery occurred automatically once **IBM Cloud restored storage availability** in the UK region. Red Sift systems resumed normal operation without requiring deep infrastructure-level changes. After disabling cloud storage dependencies where feasible, service performance stabilized as the upstream provider resolved the issue. # **Customer Impact Mitigation** * Continuous monitoring ensured rapid detection and response * Cloud storage functionality was disabled where safe to reduce impact * No customer data was lost or compromised * Service recovery verified before incident closure * Transparent communication was maintained throughout the incident We sincerely apologize for any inconvenience caused by this outage. Although the root cause was an external failure outside our control, we remain committed to improving our resilience and ensuring reliable, uninterrupted service for all customers.

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