Circle CI Outage History

Started Aug 04, 2026, 07:27 PM UTC· resolved Aug 04, 2026, 11:40 PM UTC

1. investigating Aug 04, 2026, 07:27 PM UTC

   We are experiencing increased queue times for Windows, Android, and GPU jobs. Jobs will continue to be processed but may take longer than usual to start. Thank you for your patience while our engineers work to resolve this.

2. monitoring Aug 04, 2026, 07:59 PM UTC

   We're starting to see queue times slowly recovering. We'll be monitoring this situation, we appreciate your patience.

3. monitoring Aug 04, 2026, 08:33 PM UTC

   Queue times continue to gradually recover with our third-party infrastructure provider, though we've seen a slight uptick in the last 30 mins. We're keeping an eye on this and will keep you updated as things get back to normal. Again, thank you for your patience.

4. monitoring Aug 04, 2026, 09:16 PM UTC

   Queue times for both Android and Windows jobs, which had been recovering, have started to rise again. This continues to be related to capacity constraints with our third-party infrastructure provider. We'll continue to monitor and provide updates at least every 30 minutes. We appreciate your patience.

5. monitoring Aug 04, 2026, 09:46 PM UTC

   Queue times for both Android and Windows jobs continue to be volatile, with sharp swings up and down. This remains related to capacity constraints with our third-party infrastructure provider. Our team will continue to monitor and provide updates at least every 30 minutes. We appreciate your patience.

6. monitoring Aug 04, 2026, 10:20 PM UTC

   Queue times for both Android and Windows jobs, affected by capacity constraints with our third-party infrastructure provider, have been recovering significantly for the last half hour. We're continuing to monitor for a bit longer to confirm they return to normal levels. We appreciate your patience.

7. resolved Aug 04, 2026, 11:40 PM UTC

   Queue times for Android and Windows jobs have reduced significantly over the last hour. You may still notice brief, isolated queuing at times, but this is no longer at incident-level impact. This was related to capacity constraints with a third-party infrastructure provider. We thank you for your patience while we monitored the situation. If you have any issues, please reach out to our Support team.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jul 22, 2026, 07:57 PM UTC· resolved Jul 23, 2026, 02:05 AM UTC

1. investigating Jul 22, 2026, 07:57 PM UTC

   We are investigating delays in starting jobs using the gen3 resource class.

2. investigating Jul 22, 2026, 08:43 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate elevated wait times affecting customers using gen3 machine executors. Affected jobs may take longer than usual to start. We will provide another update as soon as we have more information to share.

3. investigating Jul 22, 2026, 11:17 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate elevated wait times affecting customers using gen3 machine executors. Affected jobs may take longer than usual to start. We will provide another update as soon as we have more information to share.

4. investigating Jul 23, 2026, 12:31 AM UTC

   We have identified the issue and are working with our provider to resolve the availability of gen 3 resources. Gen 1 and Gen 2 are both fully operational.

5. resolved Jul 23, 2026, 02:05 AM UTC

   Between 19:24 UTC on 22 July and 01:50 UTC on 23 July, customers using the gen3 preview machine (Linux VM) resource classes experienced delays and, in some cases, jobs failing to start. We have removed the gen3 resource classes while we address stability issues affecting them. Unfortunately, workflows that we were unable to provision compute capacity for during this period were cancelled. Affected customers should change their resource class from gen3 to gen2 and rerun those workflows. We thank you for your patience while our team worked to resolve this.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jul 22, 2026, 06:13 AM UTC· resolved Jul 22, 2026, 06:27 AM UTC

1. monitoring Jul 22, 2026, 06:13 AM UTC

   A subset of customers may have experienced errors loading app.circleci.com starting at 03:18 UTC. A fix has been deployed and we are monitoring for full recovery. Thank you for your patience while our engineers confirm recovery. We will provide another update shortly.

2. resolved Jul 22, 2026, 06:27 AM UTC

   Between 03:18 UTC and 06:04 UTC on July 22, 2026, a subset of customers were unable to access app.circleci.com. The issue has been resolved and access has returned to normal. We thank you for your patience while our team worked on implementing a fix.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jul 20, 2026, 12:35 AM UTC· resolved Jul 20, 2026, 01:45 AM UTC

1. identified Jul 20, 2026, 12:35 AM UTC

   We have identified an issue with GitHub API requests that may cause some customers to see workflows stuck in a running state or workflows fail to start. GitHub has reported incidents on the APIs https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/ph5nns5y4gxj https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/8vfyvq16hzh9 We are monitoring the stability of GitHub APIs and will update this page as more information is available.

2. identified Jul 20, 2026, 01:24 AM UTC

   We are also seeing errors processing push event webhooks due to the upstream API outage. Users may need to retry pipelines for these push events.

3. monitoring Jul 20, 2026, 01:36 AM UTC

   We are seeing signs of recovery from the GitHub API. We will stay in a monitoring state to verify that the API error rate has recovered.

4. resolved Jul 20, 2026, 01:45 AM UTC

   GitHub API error rates have recovered to normal levels. During the incident, some customers may have seen pipelines fail to start or not receive status updates. Some pipelines may be stuck in a running state. * You should re-push commits or use the UI to manually trigger pipelines that didn't start. * Pipelines in a stuck running state should be canceled and rerun. If you encounter any issues please contact CircleCI support.

5. postmortem Jul 23, 2026, 09:10 PM UTC

   ## Summary On July 20, 2026 from 00:22 to 01:45 UTC, CircleCI customers using our GitHub integrations experienced failures running pipelines and experienced workflows getting stuck. During this incident, some pipelines triggered by users using GitHub failed to start or ran as error pipelines. Customers whose pipelines failed or ran as error pipelines during this window should re-run them. This was caused by an [upstream API degradation at GitHub](https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/ph5nns5y4gxj), which impacted many GitHub APIs that CircleCI uses to trigger and run pipelines. By 01:45 UTC, GitHub APIs recovered, and customer pipelines ran normally. The original CircleCI status page can be found [here](https://status.circleci.com/incidents/9lvbbbs9l87b). ## What Happened \(all times UTC\) Beginning 00:22 on July 20, 2026, GitHub began returning elevated errors for the following API requests: * `applications/*/token` * `repos/*/commits` * `repos/*/*/contents/*` * `repos/*/*/hooks` * `repos/*/*/hooks/*` * `repos/*/*/keys` * `repos/*/*/pulls` * `repos/*/*/statuses/*` CircleCI relies on these requests to correctly trigger and run pipelines. At 00:22, our internal monitoring alerted us to the problem. Our team began investigating, and found that a small number of pipelines belonging to GitHub projects either failed to start or ran as error pipelines. This included scheduled pipelines and workflows. In addition, a small number of customer workflows experienced stuck jobs and required a re-run of the workflow to fix. At 01:45, GitHub recovered and pipeline processing returned to normal operating levels. Only pipelines triggered during the incident window were affected, and customers should re-run those pipelines. ## Future Prevention and Process Improvement We are actively working to improve the resilience of pipeline processing during GitHub service disruptions to reduce the customer impact of similar incidents in the future. We are scoping features that will help customers recover with reduced manual steps after incidents resolve. Customer experience is our top priority, and we commit to continually improving the reliability of our systems to match the trust that our customers place in us. Please reach out to our support team with any questions or concerns.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jul 16, 2026, 11:04 PM UTC· resolved Jul 17, 2026, 12:26 AM UTC

1. investigating Jul 16, 2026, 11:04 PM UTC

   We're investigating an issue where customers may see errors loading the CircleCI web app and signing in, along with pipelines and scheduled workflows failing to start or running late. This is related to an ongoing incident affecting GitHub. You can follow GitHub's status at https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/gxycch3076xk. Our engineers are actively investigating. We will provide another update as soon as we have more information to share.

2. identified Jul 16, 2026, 11:42 PM UTC

   We are continuing to see high failure rates from GitHub APIs which are impacting login and workflow processing. We will continue to monitor the GitHub API for recovery.

3. monitoring Jul 17, 2026, 12:09 AM UTC

   What's happening The upstream incident affecting GitHub has been mitigated and is now being monitored on GitHub's side. You can follow GitHub's status at https://www.githubstatus.com/. What can you expect Access to the CircleCI web app, sign-in, and pipeline and workflow processing are returning to normal. You may still see intermittent errors or delayed scheduled pipelines and workflows as systems stabilize. Thank you for your patience while we monitor for full recovery.

4. resolved Jul 17, 2026, 12:26 AM UTC

   An incident affecting GitHub's API caused CircleCI customers to experience errors loading the web app and signing in, along with pipelines and scheduled workflows failing to start or running late. GitHub has resolved the underlying incident (https://www.githubstatus.com/) and all affected functionality has returned to normal. Customers whose jobs or pipelines failed may rerun them. Scheduled pipelines and workflows that were missed during the incident will not run automatically and will need to be re-triggered. We thank you for your patience.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jul 14, 2026, 10:54 PM UTC· resolved Jul 15, 2026, 12:32 AM UTC

1. identified Jul 14, 2026, 10:54 PM UTC

   On July 13 between 15:30 UTC and 22:40 UTC, we experienced delays starting jobs on Docker (Gen 2) resource classes due to capacity constraints from our cloud provider. Delays reached up to approximately 1 minute 48 seconds. We are continuing to experience these delays again since approximately 15:45 UTC. So far, delays have reached up to approximately 1 minute 19 seconds. We are working with our cloud provider to add capacity and will update this incident as the situation changes.

2. resolved Jul 15, 2026, 12:32 AM UTC

   On July 13 between 15:30 UTC and 22:40 UTC, we experienced delays starting jobs on Docker (Gen 2) resource classes due to capacity constraints from our cloud provider. The same issue recurred on July 14 between 15:45 UTC and 22:50 UTC. Delays reached up to 25 minutes on July 13 and up to 24 minutes on July 14. The medium+ and 2 X-large+ resource classes saw the longest waits. Earlier updates in this incident reported figures based on average wait times, which didn't reflect the maximum impact some customers may have experienced. Wait times have now returned to normal. We are continuing to work with our cloud provider to add capacity ahead of the next peak period. Thank you for your patience.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jul 14, 2026, 02:49 AM UTC· resolved Jul 14, 2026, 05:15 AM UTC

1. investigating Jul 14, 2026, 02:49 AM UTC

   We are currently investigating login errors affecting some customers using Bitbucket as their identity provider.

2. investigating Jul 14, 2026, 03:29 AM UTC

   Our team continues to investigate login errors affecting some customers using Bitbucket as their identity provider.

3. investigating Jul 14, 2026, 03:51 AM UTC

   What's impacted Some customers logging in with a Bitbucket-linked identity are affected. This may also include customers logging in with GitHub but have a linked Bitbucket identity on their account. Additionally, some customers are experiencing workflows that are not starting or updating. What can you expect Affected customers may see login errors. Some customers may also notice workflows that fail to start or do not update as expected. Thank you for your patience while our engineers investigate. Next update We will provide another update as soon as we have more information to share

4. monitoring Jul 14, 2026, 04:21 AM UTC

   What's impacted Some customers logging in with a Bitbucket-linked identity were affected. This may also have included customers logging in with GitHub who have a linked Bitbucket identity on their account. Some customers also experienced workflows that were not starting or updating. What can you expect A fix has been deployed. We are monitoring the situation to confirm full recovery. Next update We will provide an update if anything changes

5. resolved Jul 14, 2026, 05:15 AM UTC

   The issue where customers logging in with a Bitbucket-linked identity experienced login errors, and some customers experienced workflows that failed to start or did not update, has been resolved. What you may still experience and need to do - If you use Bitbucket as your login method, please log out and reauthenticate the CircleCI Bitbucket integration on your account. - If any of your workflows are stuck or showing missing status checks, please rerun them to pick up the fix. - If you continue to experience issues after taking these steps, please reach out to CircleCI Support. We thank you for your patience while our team worked on implementing a fix.

6. postmortem Jul 14, 2026, 10:31 PM UTC

   ## Summary From 01:33 UTC to 05:18 UTC on July 14, 2026, customers with a Bitbucket-linked identity were unable to log in to CircleCI, and some customers experienced workflows that failed to start or update, due to a change in how Bitbucket's OAuth service reports account permissions. At 05:07 UTC, we deployed a fix that corrected how our systems read the updated permissions field. Some customers needed to log out and re-authenticate their Bitbucket integration after we deployed the fix. Our systems continued processing the backlog of affected jobs until 08:39 UTC. We thank our customers for their patience as we resolved this incident. Please reach out to our support team with any questions or concerns. The status page for this incident can be found [here](https://status.circleci.com/incidents/gsyjwybg477g). ## Background CircleCI supports logging in with a GitHub account, a Bitbucket account, or an email and password. When a customer logs in with a Bitbucket-linked identity, or when CircleCI needs to refresh the customer's access on their behalf, we exchange an authorization token with Bitbucket's OAuth service. This exchange includes a list of the permissions, or "scopes," the customer has granted us, which Bitbucket and CircleCI use to confirm what CircleCI is authorized to do on the customer’s behalf. ## What Happened \(All times UTC\) On April 8, 2026, [Bitbucket announced a change to its OAuth service](https://developer.atlassian.com/cloud/bitbucket/changelog/#CHANGE-3139): it would be renaming the field used to report a customer's granted permissions. Bitbucket ran a transition period during which both the old and new field names were available, then fully removed the old field name on May 4, 2026. Our systems had not been updated to recognize the new field name, so once Bitbucket fully phased out the old one, requests that depended on it began to fail. At 01:33 on July 14, 2026, our systems began failing to process permissions information returned for Bitbucket-linked accounts, because our systems still expected the old permissions structure. This caused login attempts for all Bitbucket-linked accounts to fail, including for customers who log in with GitHub but have a Bitbucket identity linked to their account. At 01:59, automated monitoring alerted our engineering team to a spike in errors on the affected systems. The team began investigating immediately, confirmed customer impact at 02:38, and alerted customers via our status page at 02:51. By 03:00, the team had isolated the failures to the renamed Bitbucket field. Beginning at 03:17, workflow status updates for Bitbucket pipelines belonging to customers with an expired access token began to be dropped. The Bitbucket permissions check is used broadly across our platform, and these permissions failures also affected some of our internal job-processing systems. This caused a subset of workflows to become stuck without a final status, and caused some pull requests to show missing or stuck status checks. At 04:21, the team deployed an initial fix that resolved the underlying issue, restoring the login flow and returning our internal permissions system to normal operation. Some affected customers needed to log out and log back in to pick up the fix. By 05:07, the team deployed two additional fixes so our systems would begin accepting Bitbucket's new permissions field format going forward. We resolved the incident at 05:18. Some customers did need to log out and re-authenticate their Bitbucket integration before their account fully recovered. Our systems continued processing a backlog of affected jobs, returning to normal levels by approximately 08:39. ## Future Prevention and Process Improvement We are taking the following steps to prevent a recurrence and improve our response time: **We are hardening our authorization code against upstream API changes.** This incident happened because our system did not gracefully handle a renamed field in a response from a third-party identity provider. We will be immediately updating our authorization code so that unexpected or missing fields from GitHub, Bitbucket, and GitLab are handled safely. **We are improving how we track upstream provider changes.** We currently already monitor changelogs from our identity providers for exactly this kind of breaking change, but we didn't add this particular provider change to our monitoring in time to catch it before it shipped. We are auditing and expanding this monitoring so provider announcements reach our team before they affect customers. **We are improving how we classify and communicate incidents in their earliest minutes.** This incident's initial classification did not immediately reflect its customer-facing severity. We are refining our incident tooling and guidance to help engineers identify and communicate customer impact more quickly. **We are improving the resilience of our workflow-processing pipeline.** A downstream failure in this incident caused some workflow status updates to be dropped rather than retried or clearly surfaced. We are reviewing this system's retry and error-handling behavior so similar downstream failures are more visible and easier to recover from. Customer experience is our top priority, and we commit to continually improving the reliability of our systems to match the trust that our customers place in us. Please reach out to our support team with any questions or concerns.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jul 13, 2026, 09:52 PM UTC· resolved Jul 14, 2026, 11:18 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 13, 2026, 09:52 PM UTC

   We're received some reports of intermittent network issues between our mac infrastructure and a VCS provider again. We are investigating and will provide updates.

2. investigating Jul 13, 2026, 10:21 PM UTC

   We're still investigating these intermittent network issues. We'll update again shortly, we appreciate your patience.

3. investigating Jul 13, 2026, 11:13 PM UTC

   We've been able to reproduce the issue, but it still appears to be very much intermittent. We're continuing to work with our Mac infrastructure provider to help diagnose the issue. We'll update again soon.

4. monitoring Jul 13, 2026, 11:35 PM UTC

   We've identified the issue. Some customers may experience jobs that hang or fail to progress during Github fetch steps due to intermittent networking issues. Our engineers are actively monitoring. In the meantime, we've seen success with increasing the no_output_timeout to 15 - 20 min to allow more time for Github fetches. This can be done by following this community guide: https://support.circleci.com/hc/en-us/articles/360007188574-Build-has-Hit-Timeout-Limit

5. identified Jul 14, 2026, 01:59 PM UTC

   Unfortunately there are still some customers that may be experiencing jobs that hang or fail to progress during Github fetch steps due to ongoing intermittent networking issues with our Mac infrastructure provider. Our engineers are actively working with them to resolve this. We appreciate your patience. In the meantime, we've seen success with increasing the no_output_timeout to 15 - 20 min to allow more time for Github fetches. This can be done by following this community guide: https://support.circleci.com/hc/en-us/articles/360007188574-Build-has-Hit-Timeout-Limit

6. identified Jul 14, 2026, 03:35 PM UTC

   Our Mac infrastructure provider is testing changes to their network configuration in an effort to isolate the source of the issue. We're actively validating whether this resolves the impact and will follow up with another update soon. In the meantime, increasing the no_output_timeout to 15-20 min continues to help: https://support.circleci.com/hc/en-us/articles/360007188574-Build-has-Hit-Timeout-Limit

7. identified Jul 14, 2026, 04:31 PM UTC

   We've identified the issue as some inbound routes from the affected VCS provider causing significantly lower available bandwidth which is negatively impacting repo fetch times. We're working with our Mac infrastructure provider to attempt to shift inbound traffic to a different route, however this process may take an extended period of time to complete. We will continue to provide updates as they become available. As we've shared in previous updates, increasing the no_output_timeout to 15-20 min continues to help: https://support.circleci.com/hc/en-us/articles/360007188574-Build-has-Hit-Timeout-Limit

8. monitoring Jul 14, 2026, 04:58 PM UTC

   Our Mac infrastructure provider has shifted the inbound routes and we are seeing recovery in VCS fetch times. We will be continuing to monitor this issue over the next few hours. We'll update again soon.

9. monitoring Jul 14, 2026, 06:28 PM UTC

   We're continuing to see slow, progressive recovery in VCS fetch times. We're going to continuing monitoring and update again soon. We appreciate your patience.

10. investigating Jul 14, 2026, 08:18 PM UTC

    We're starting to see VCS fetch times rising again. Our engineering team is actively investigating and working with our Mac infrastructure provider to resolve this. Again, we appreciate your patience.

11. monitoring Jul 14, 2026, 10:15 PM UTC

    Our Mac infrastructure provider has shifted more traffic to working network providers and we're starting to see significant recovery again in VCS fetch times. As always, our engineering team will continue to monitor this closely and we'll provide another update soon.

12. resolved Jul 14, 2026, 11:18 PM UTC

    We continue to see significant VCS fetch time recovery over the last couple of hours. We're going to resolve this incident, and our engineering team will continue to monitor closely. We greatly appreciate your patience as we worked through this with our Mac infrastructure provider. Please reach out to our Support team if you have any issues.

13. postmortem Jul 16, 2026, 01:56 AM UTC

    ## Summary From 18:00 UTC on July 13, 2026 to 23:18 UTC on July 14, 2026, some customers running jobs on CircleCI's macOS fleet experienced jobs that hung or failed to progress during GitHub fetch steps. For these customers, GitHub fetch steps which would ordinarily take 1-2 minutes took 20-30 minutes, and timed out. The issue was caused by a capacity and routing problem on the network path between our Mac infrastructure provider and GitHub, and the associated intermittent networking issues slowed down fetches from GitHub. During the entire incident, our team worked directly with our Mac infrastructure provider to identify and reroute traffic away from the affected network paths. We resolved an initial occurrence at 19:40 UTC on July 13. The issue recurred at 21:52 UTC that same day, we reopened the incident, and it was fully resolved by 23:18 UTC on July 14. Our macOS fleet had a similar issue several weeks ago. From 20:18 UTC on June 24, 2026 to 03:09 UTC on June 25, 2026, customers experienced a [similar incident](https://status.circleci.com/incidents/gvysjmkf4ct9) affecting the ability of macOS jobs to reach GitHub. That incident was also caused by a network routing problem in our Mac infrastructure provider. We thank our customers for their patience while we worked through this incident. Please see below for specific actions which CircleCI and our Mac infrastructure provider will be taking. Please reach out to our support team with any questions or concerns. The status pages for this incident can be found [here](https://status.circleci.com/incidents/n1tc2lw9q7l0) and [here](https://status.circleci.com/incidents/7cnl777wp9qz). ## Background CircleCI's macOS jobs are hosted on a third-party Mac infrastructure provider. That provider connects to the broader internet, including services like GitHub, over multiple redundant upstream network paths. When one of those paths is experiencing reduced capacity or a routing problem, jobs that are fetching code or dependencies from a destination along that network path can slow down or hang intermittently, even when CircleCI's own platform, the third-party infrastructure provider, and the destination service are all operating normally. ## What Happened _\(All times UTC\)_ At 18:00 on July 13, some customers running macOS jobs began experiencing intermittent failures and delays fetching code and dependencies from GitHub. We opened an investigation and alerted our customers via our status page at 18:55. By 19:04, our Mac infrastructure provider identified increased latency on one of its network paths and rerouted traffic around it. Fetch times recovered, and we moved the incident to `Monitoring` at 19:29, and to `Resolved` at 19:40. At 20:44 UTC, customers reported that the issue had returned. We reopened the incident and updated our status page to `Investigating` at 21:52. Over the following two hours, we worked closely with our infrastructure provider to gather diagnostic data in an effort to isolate the affected network path. In the meantime, we published guidance recommending that customers increase their `no_output_timeout` setting to 15–20 minutes, to allow more time for GitHub fetches to complete during the intermittent slowdowns, and moved the status page to `Monitoring` at 23:35. After publishing the workaround guidance at 23:35 UTC on July 13, we expected the underlying network issue to improve overnight. It did not. At 13:59 UTC on July 14, we confirmed that customers were still experiencing intermittent failures and moved the status page back to `Investigating`. Our engineering team reproduced the failure directly using our own testing tools, which helped confirm this was a general `git-fetch` issue rather than something specific to any particular build tool, container image, or software update. At 15:35, we updated the status page to share that our infrastructure provider was testing changes to its network configuration to isolate the source of the issue. At 16:31, we updated the status page again to share that we'd identified the cause as reduced inbound bandwidth on a specific route, and that we were working with our provider to shift traffic to a different route. At 16:36, our infrastructure provider identified the affected network paths and shifted traffic away from them, fetch times recovered, and at 16:58, we updated the status page to `Monitoring`. By early afternoon, some customers were again seeing slow fetch times, and we moved the status page back to `Investigating` at 20:18. Our infrastructure provider identified two additional network paths with degraded performance and shifted traffic away from them by 22:07. Fetch times stabilized over the following hour, and we marked the incident `Resolved` at 23:18. In total, customers running Mac jobs may have experienced intermittent job slowdowns or failures for portions of the window between 18:00 UTC on July 13 and 23:18 UTC on July 14. Our infrastructure provider has since reported clean test results across its network and believes the underlying capacity issue originated further upstream, closer to GitHub, rather than within its own network. We are continuing to monitor this closely. ## Future Prevention and Process Improvement We are taking the following steps to prevent a recurrence and improve our response time: **We are building additional automated monitoring for macOS fleet GitHub-fetch performance.** Our extensive automated monitoring did not catch this incident. We are now adding end-to-end monitoring for GitHub fetches in particular, in order to detect similar issues proactively. **We are working directly with our Mac infrastructure provider on faster, more proactive detection.** We are asking our provider to build monitoring that can detect a degraded network path and reroute around it automatically, rather than relying on CircleCI to identify and request a reroute during an active incident. **We are turning the diagnostic tooling we built during this incident into a standing capability.** This will let us detect and reproduce this class of network failure on demand going forward, rather than assembling test infrastructure during an active incident. **We are reviewing our incident response process for a sufficient confirmation window before marking a network-related incident Resolved.** This incident briefly recurred after an early, premature resolution; we are formalizing a minimum period of confirmed-clean monitoring before closing incidents of this type. We will continue to provide regular updates along the way as investigation and remediation continues. **We are actively moving from a single provider for Mac infrastructure** **to multiple providers.** This will allow CircleCI to route incoming customer workloads to the most available and best-performing provider. Customer experience is our top priority, and we commit to continually improving the reliability of our systems to match the trust that our customers place in us. Please reach out to our support team with any questions or concerns.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jul 02, 2026, 03:25 PM UTC· resolved Jul 02, 2026, 04:44 PM UTC

1. investigating Jul 02, 2026, 03:25 PM UTC

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. investigating Jul 02, 2026, 04:07 PM UTC

   We are investigating an issue that may cause some customers to be redirected to a login page and prevents some pipelines from starting. Thank you for your patience as we continue our mitigation of this issue.

3. monitoring Jul 02, 2026, 04:24 PM UTC

   We have identified a source of increased system load which caused failures processing API requests. We have mitigated the issue and jobs are now running as expected and UI access has recovered. Some pipelines may have failed or failed to start. Resubmitting should correct these issues. We are continuing to monitor to ensure recovery.

4. monitoring Jul 02, 2026, 04:29 PM UTC

   Pipelines are continuing to run as normal. We will continue monitoring for recovery.

5. resolved Jul 02, 2026, 04:44 PM UTC

   Pipelines and UI access have fully recovered. Please contact customer support if you have issues running builds. This incident has been resolved.

6. postmortem Jul 10, 2026, 06:57 PM UTC

   ## Summary On July 2, 2026, from 15:12 UTC to 16:44 UTC, some CircleCI customers experienced failures starting pipelines and difficulty accessing the CircleCI UI, including an inability to log in. Customers triggering pipelines via the API may also have had pipelines fail to run. The incident originated from a combination of internal maintenance and customer-initiated project deletions running concurrently, which caused elevated load on a data service. The connection layer between our API and that data service was not configured to time out slow responses under the elevated load conditions seen during this incident. This eventually exhausted available threads and prevented the request routing layer from handling any other requests, resulting in customer-facing errors. The affected services were scaled up and the internal maintenance job was canceled to reduce pressure, allowing all affected functionality to return to normal. Customers whose jobs failed during this window may rerun affected jobs. A small number of customers may still see workflows that appear to be running; this is actively being corrected and does not impact billing. We thank you for your patience while our team worked on implementing a fix. ## What Happened \(all times UTC\) At 13:30 on July 2, 2026, as part of normal platform maintenance, our engineering team began a data deletion job, divided into several hundred individual maintenance tasks. At 14:40, unrelated to our platform maintenance, a significant number of customer project deletion requests were received and began executing. At 15:12, the combined load from the maintenance tasks and the customer-driven projection deletions caused an internal data service to slow down, and this began cascading into our API layer. Because connections between the API layer and the workflows data service were not configured to time out slow responses under elevated load conditions, the API-handling components became overwhelmed, went unresponsive, and began failing their health checks. This caused our request routing layer to lose available upstream requests, resulting in customers seeing errors when attempting to access the UI, to log in via GitHub or Bitbucket OAuth, or to start pipelines. At 15:16, our monitoring systems alerted and engineers were paged. The team investigated and confirmed the source of the elevated load. At 15:30 Engineers began to scale up the affected services and cancelled a long-running maintenance task to drain the load. The team noted signs of that the system was recovering around 16:12 and adjusted the status to monitoring at 16:24. At 16:44, the team confirmed that all customer-facing services had recovered to normal operating levels. Background load from the deletion job drained by approximately 17:00. Following the incident, we discovered a small number of workflows continued to inaccurately report that they were in a running state. This should be corrected within the next few days. In all cases, customers will only be billed for actual compute time used. ## Future Prevention and Process Improvement Our team is implementing the following improvements as a result of this incident: * After the incident was resolved we added timeout protections on connections between our API layer and internal data services, so that slow responses from a downstream service cannot exhaust API worker capacity. * We are actively investigating ways to enforce resource limits on background data tasks to prevent them from impacting customer-facing services. * We are improving observability and alerting on the affected data service so that resource pressure is detected earlier, before it reaches a level that impacts customers.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jun 29, 2026, 10:23 AM UTC· resolved Jun 29, 2026, 04:58 PM UTC

1. investigating Jun 29, 2026, 10:23 AM UTC

   We are investigating reports that some customers are unable to access their organizations in CircleCI. Those affected may see errors when loading their organizations. Our engineering team is actively investigating.

2. investigating Jun 29, 2026, 11:33 AM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate reports that some customers are unable to access their organizations in CircleCI. Those affected may see errors when loading their organizations. Our engineering team are still working to identify the cause. We will share another update as soon as we have more information.

3. investigating Jun 29, 2026, 11:44 AM UTC

   We are still investigating reports that some customers cannot access their organizations in CircleCI. Early findings suggest the problem may be related to GitHub authorization, where affected users receive a 403 from GitHub indicating the resource is SAML protected and the OAuth token may not be authorized. We have not yet confirmed this as the root cause. As a potential workaround, some users may be able to restore access by performing a re-authentication: https://support.circleci.com/hc/en-us/articles/360051228052-How-to-Perform-a-Re-Authentication We will post another update once we have more certainty.

4. investigating Jun 29, 2026, 12:16 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate reports that some customers cannot access their organizations in CircleCI. Our investigation continues to point to an authorization issue between CircleCI and GitHub. Some affected users have received a 403 from GitHub indicating the resource is SAML protected and the OAuth token may not be authorized. We previously shared re-authenticating as a potential workaround. We have since received reports that this didn't restore access for all affected customers, so we don't consider it a reliable resolution at this time. Our engineering team is continuing to investigate this to determine the cause and next steps. We will post another update as soon as we have more information. We apologize for the continued disruption and appreciate your patience.

5. identified Jun 29, 2026, 03:54 PM UTC

   We have identified the cause of errors accessing orgs. We are implementing a fix, and will monitor for recovery as the change rolls out.

6. monitoring Jun 29, 2026, 04:44 PM UTC

   Error rates viewing orgs are recovering. We will continue to monitor to verify the fix resolves the issues.

7. resolved Jun 29, 2026, 04:58 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jun 26, 2026, 03:00 PM UTC· resolved Jun 26, 2026, 03:00 PM UTC

1. resolved Jun 26, 2026, 03:29 PM UTC

   We observed a surge in demand for Xcode 26.6 and have since mitigated the incident by increasing the available capacity for that Xcode version. Customers may have seen jobs queueing for ~10-15 mins.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jun 25, 2026, 10:44 PM UTC· resolved Jun 25, 2026, 11:03 PM UTC

1. investigating Jun 25, 2026, 10:44 PM UTC

   Customers using the Usage API may not be able to access the API. Our team is investigating.

2. resolved Jun 25, 2026, 11:03 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jun 23, 2026, 06:34 PM UTC· resolved Jun 23, 2026, 07:58 PM UTC

1. investigating Jun 23, 2026, 06:34 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of delays starting Docker jobs.

2. identified Jun 23, 2026, 06:42 PM UTC

   We are deploying a change to mitigate this issue.

3. identified Jun 23, 2026, 07:04 PM UTC

   What's impacted Customers running Docker jobs. Affected jobs are queuing rather than starting, resulting in elevated wait times. What can you expect Docker jobs may remain stuck in "preparing environment" for an extended period. Our engineers have identified the cause and are actively working to restore normal job startup times. Thank you for your patience while our team deploys a fix. Next update We will provide another update as soon as more information is available

4. monitoring Jun 23, 2026, 07:29 PM UTC

   What's happening Our engineers have deployed a fix and we are observing the job backlog clearing. Docker jobs are now starting normally. What's impacted Customers who submitted Docker jobs during the incident window may still see some jobs completing with elevated queue times. Newly submitted jobs should be starting at normal times. What can you expect Docker job startup times are returning to normal. Thank you for your patience while our engineers resolved this issue. We are monitoring the recovery and will provide a further update if the situation changes.

5. resolved Jun 23, 2026, 07:58 PM UTC

   The issue where customers running Docker jobs experienced significant delays, with jobs stuck in a "preparing environment" state, has now been resolved. We thank you for your patience while our team worked on implementing a fix.

6. postmortem Jun 27, 2026, 12:15 AM UTC

   ## Summary On Tuesday, June 23, 2026, our engineering team identified that a single Docker job cluster was operating below expected performance levels. Our infrastructure is organized into routing groups, each responsible for handling a specific segment of traffic, and this cluster was the sole member of its group. To address the performance issue, they initiated a standard two-step procedure to safely take it out of rotation: first, update the routing configuration to stop directing traffic to the cluster, then take it offline. When the team moved to take the cluster offline, the first step of the procedure was skipped. The cluster was removed from the available pool, but the routing configuration was not updated, meaning traffic continued to be directed to the routing group even though it had no capacity to process work. With no other clusters in the routing group to absorb the traffic, affected jobs had nowhere to go and began queuing rather than starting. This is a routine and safe operation when the two-step procedure is followed correctly, this incident exposed a gap in our tooling that allowed the procedure to be completed out of order. The issue began at approximately 17:25 UTC and was fully resolved by 19:46 UTC, for a total impact window of roughly 2 hours and 20 minutes. Only Docker jobs were affected; other job types, including machine and macOS jobs, continued to operate normally. Beyond the missed step, several factors extended the impact window. An automated alert fired within a minute of the change deploying, but was dismissed as expected behavior. This delayed detection by nearly an hour. When engineers attempted to accelerate recovery by restoring a prior known-good version, they encountered unexpected issues with the rollback process, adding further delay before the fix could be deployed. The original status page for this incident can be found [here](https://status.circleci.com/incidents/rp9y8kszn25j). ## How Job Routing Works CircleCI uses Nomad as its job scheduling system for Docker-based jobs. When a job is triggered, it is routed to one of several Nomad clusters, organized into routing groups each responsible for handling a specific segment of traffic. This multi-cluster architecture is intentional: clusters are isolated from one another so that an issue in one does not impact the others, limiting blast radius and improving overall resiliency. Under normal circumstances, if a cluster becomes unavailable, traffic is automatically rerouted to the remaining operational clusters in its routing group, allowing jobs to continue without interruption. ## What Happened \(All times UTC\) Prior to the incident, our engineering team identified that a single Docker job cluster was operating below expected performance levels. Our infrastructure is organized into routing groups, each responsible for handling a specific segment of traffic, and this cluster was the sole member of its group. To address the performance issue, they initiated a standard two-step procedure to safely take it out of rotation. At 16:58, our engineering team applied a configuration change to remove the affected cluster from service. The first step of the two-step procedure was missed. The cluster was removed from the available pool, but the routing configuration was not updated, leaving traffic still being directed to a routing group with no capacity to process it. When the configuration change was fully deployed at 17:25, the affected jobs began to queue. At 17:26, our monitoring alerted us to reduced job throughput on the affected cluster. Because throughput on that cluster was expected to drop as part of the cluster rotation procedure, the alert was interpreted as expected behavior and no action was taken. By 18:19, a series of customer support tickets made clear that something beyond expected behavior was occurring. A formal incident was declared at 18:28 and engineers began investigating. By 18:33, the team confirmed the impact was isolated to a subset of Docker jobs and identified a large backlog of queued jobs. At 18:41, a fix was merged to restore the affected cluster back into the available pool. Deployment of that fix was delayed because the CI smoke tests assume functioning clusters, leading to some rework of the pipeline itself. In parallel, the team attempted to accelerate recovery at 18:54 by restoring a prior known-good configuration directly, but encountered a conflict that left multiple active versions running simultaneously, preventing a clean rollback. The fix was fully deployed at 19:20 and Docker jobs began processing again. By 19:28, the team confirmed the backlog was actively clearing and newly submitted jobs were starting at normal times. Customers who had accumulated queued jobs during the incident period may have experienced a surge in concurrent job starts upon recovery, potentially hitting plan concurrency limits, which would have resulted in jobs still queueing while we processed the backlog. In total, the period during which Docker jobs were unable to start lasted from approximately 17:25 to 19:20, roughly 1 hour and 55 minutes. The additional time from 19:20 to 19:46 was spent processing the accumulated backlog, during which some previously queued jobs completed with elevated wait times. ## Future Prevention and Process Improvement We are taking the following steps to prevent a recurrence and improve our response time: **We are strengthening our failover architecture.** Our multi-cluster design is built for resiliency, and while automatic failover mechanisms are already in place, this incident exposed a gap in our safeguards. We are closing that gap to ensure traffic is rerouted to healthy clusters across routing groups regardless of whether a cluster goes down unexpectedly or is intentionally taken offline. **We are enhancing our cluster rotation procedure.** This incident was possible because our tooling allowed an invalid state to exist, a cluster removed from the available pool while the routing configuration still directed traffic to it. We are updating this tooling to enforce that routing configuration and cluster availability are always updated together, and that the procedure cannot be completed out of order. **We are improving our monitoring and alerting.** The automated alert that fired during this incident was dismissed because it appeared consistent with the operation being performed. We are improving our monitoring so that unexpected side effects are surfaced clearly and are not confused with expected behavior. **We are improving our rollback capabilities.** During the incident, our team encountered delays when attempting to deploy the fix. We are auditing our deployment configurations to ensure that rollbacks can be executed more quickly and reliably during incidents. Reliability is our top priority, and we are committed to ensuring that infrastructure upgrades like this one are executed with the appropriate safeguards in place.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jun 11, 2026, 09:46 PM UTC· resolved Jun 11, 2026, 10:13 PM UTC

1. investigating Jun 11, 2026, 09:46 PM UTC

   What's happening We are investigating an issue we believe is related to an ongoing incident with Atlassian Bitbucket's authentication service. We are actively monitoring Bitbucket's status. What's impacted Customers using Bitbucket as their VCS provider may be experiencing disruptions. What can you expect You may see errors when CircleCI attempts to interact with your Bitbucket repositories. Thank you for your patience while our engineers investigate. We will provide an update as soon as we have more information.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jun 11, 2026, 09:31 PM UTC· resolved Jun 12, 2026, 12:18 AM UTC

1. investigating Jun 11, 2026, 09:31 PM UTC

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. identified Jun 11, 2026, 10:05 PM UTC

   What's happening We are investigating an issue we believe is related to an ongoing incident with Atlassian Bitbucket's authentication service. We are actively monitoring Bitbucket's status. What's impacted Customers using Bitbucket as their VCS provider may be experiencing disruptions. What can you expect You may see errors when CircleCI attempts to interact with your Bitbucket repositories. Thank you for your patience while our engineers investigate. We will provide an update as soon as we have more information.

3. identified Jun 11, 2026, 10:57 PM UTC

   What's happening Atlassian Bitbucket has acknowledged an incident affecting their OAuth service, which is the cause of the errors our customers are experiencing. The status of their incident is available at: https://bitbucket.status.atlassian.com/incidents/h51sr145gsmx What's impacted Customers using Bitbucket as their VCS provider may be experiencing disruptions. What can you expect You may see errors when CircleCI attempts to interact with your Bitbucket repositories. Customers using Bitbucket as their login provider may also be unable to authenticate to CircleCI. We will provide an update as soon as we have more information. Thank you for your patience while we monitor Bitbucket's incident and recovery.

4. monitoring Jun 12, 2026, 12:10 AM UTC

   What's happening Atlassian Bitbucket has moved their OAuth service incident to monitoring. You can follow their status at https://bitbucket.status.atlassian.com/incidents/h51sr145gsmx What's impacted Customers using Bitbucket as their VCS provider may be experiencing disruptions. What can you expect You may see errors when CircleCI attempts to interact with your Bitbucket repositories. Customers using Bitbucket as their login provider may also be unable to authenticate to CircleCI. Thank you for your patience while we continue to monitor recovery.

5. resolved Jun 12, 2026, 12:18 AM UTC

   Customers using Bitbucket as their VCS provider or as their login provider experienced errors when interacting with Bitbucket repositories and authenticating to CircleCI. This was caused by an incident with Atlassian Bitbucket's OAuth service, which has now been resolved and all affected functionality has returned to normal.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jun 10, 2026, 10:39 PM UTC· resolved Jun 10, 2026, 11:07 PM UTC

1. investigating Jun 10, 2026, 10:39 PM UTC

   We are investigating reports of orb publishing failing.

2. identified Jun 10, 2026, 10:55 PM UTC

   We have identified the cause of the failure and are rolling out a change.

3. monitoring Jun 10, 2026, 10:56 PM UTC

   The fix has been rolled out and we are monitoring for recovery.

4. resolved Jun 10, 2026, 11:07 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jun 10, 2026, 04:30 PM UTC· resolved Jun 10, 2026, 04:41 PM UTC

1. investigating Jun 10, 2026, 04:30 PM UTC

   Some users may have seen delays or missing commit statuses on GitHub PRs due to an ongoing GitHub API incident. We are continuing to process builds as normal. We will provide further updates as we get more information

2. investigating Jun 10, 2026, 04:30 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. monitoring Jun 10, 2026, 04:32 PM UTC

   We are seeing signs of recovery from the GitHub API.

4. resolved Jun 10, 2026, 04:41 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jun 09, 2026, 05:45 PM UTC· resolved Jun 09, 2026, 06:43 PM UTC

1. investigating Jun 09, 2026, 05:45 PM UTC

   Some customers are experiencing 500 errors when making requests to the pipeline values and workflow API endpoints, as well as errors in the UI. Engineers are actively investigating.

2. investigating Jun 09, 2026, 06:20 PM UTC

   Our engineers are continuing to investigate the 500 errors customers are experiencing on the pipeline values and workflow API endpoints, as well as errors in the UI. Jobs currently running are not impacted.

3. monitoring Jun 09, 2026, 06:32 PM UTC

   A fix has been deployed for the 500 errors customers were experiencing on the pipeline values and workflow API endpoints and in the UI. Engineers are monitoring the change. Jobs running are not impacted

4. resolved Jun 09, 2026, 06:43 PM UTC

   Between 13:29 UTC and 18:20 UTC on June 9, 2026, some customers experienced 500 errors when making requests to the pipeline values and workflow API endpoints, as well as errors in the UI. Jobs running were not impacted during this window. The issue has been resolved and all affected functionality has returned to normal. We thank you for your patience while our team worked on implementing a fix.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jun 07, 2026, 04:20 AM UTC· resolved Jun 07, 2026, 04:44 AM UTC

1. identified Jun 07, 2026, 04:20 AM UTC

   We have identified an issue causing macOS jobs to fail to start and are working to restore service. This impacts customers running macOS jobs across all resource classes. Thank you for your patience while our engineers work to resolve this. We will provide another update within 30 minutes.

2. resolved Jun 07, 2026, 04:44 AM UTC

   This issue has been resolved and macOS jobs across all resource classes are starting normally again. Customers whose jobs failed to start during this window may rerun them. We thank you for your patience while our team worked on implementing a fix.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jun 02, 2026, 12:52 PM UTC· resolved Jun 02, 2026, 01:11 PM UTC

1. investigating Jun 02, 2026, 12:52 PM UTC

   We are noticing an increase in errors when pulling Docker images. We are investigating.

2. monitoring Jun 02, 2026, 01:06 PM UTC

   We identified the issue and have deployed a fix and are now monitoring.

3. resolved Jun 02, 2026, 01:11 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

Read the full incident report →

Started Jun 01, 2026, 01:04 AM UTC· resolved Jun 01, 2026, 03:26 AM UTC

1. investigating Jun 01, 2026, 01:04 AM UTC

   Mac jobs are continuing to experience failures. Our infrastructure provider is continuing to report that they are experiencing a DDoS attack causing high network latency and packet loss for our Mac fleet. We are working to bring up additional capacity to restore service.

2. investigating Jun 01, 2026, 01:05 AM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. monitoring Jun 01, 2026, 01:36 AM UTC

   We are seeing Mac jobs starting successfully and improved network connectivity to the Mac fleet, however our infrastructure provider is continuing to experience a DDoS attack. We will continue to monitor the recovery while bringing additional capacity to our platform.

4. monitoring Jun 01, 2026, 02:05 AM UTC

   Mac jobs are running successfully, and we are continuing to monitor the performance of our Mac fleet. Thank you for your patience.

5. resolved Jun 01, 2026, 03:26 AM UTC

   All Mac jobs are running successfully. Our infrastructure provider has confirmed that the DDoS attack has been mitigated and that services have been restored. Thank you for your patience during this incident.

Read the full incident report →

Started May 29, 2026, 02:51 PM UTC· resolved May 29, 2026, 06:10 PM UTC

1. investigating May 29, 2026, 02:51 PM UTC

   We are currently investigating this issue.

2. investigating May 29, 2026, 02:57 PM UTC

   We've identified duplicate records in the Usage API data for yesterday, 5/28. Data is available, but may be inaccurate. We continue to investigate.

3. resolved May 29, 2026, 06:10 PM UTC

   The Usage API incident has been resolved.

Read the full incident report →

Started May 14, 2026, 04:49 PM UTC· resolved May 14, 2026, 07:38 PM UTC

1. investigating May 14, 2026, 04:49 PM UTC

   Jobs pulling dependencies from maven central are experiencing increased 429 errors due to maven central rate limits. We are investigating the issue and working to identify mitigations for customer jobs.

2. monitoring May 14, 2026, 06:08 PM UTC

   We're monitoring to verify that rate limited jobs are recovering.

3. resolved May 14, 2026, 07:38 PM UTC

   Customers running jobs that pulled dependencies from Maven Central experienced elevated 429 (rate limit) errors. We have worked with Sonatype to allow list CircleCI's dedicated IP ranges. Customers using our IP ranges feature should no longer see Maven Central rate limits affect their jobs while we continue work to fully address the issue for all customers. Customers whose jobs failed during this window may rerun affected jobs. We thank you for your patience while our team worked on implementing a fix.

Read the full incident report →

Started May 06, 2026, 07:42 PM UTC· resolved May 06, 2026, 08:13 PM UTC

1. investigating May 06, 2026, 07:42 PM UTC

   We are having an issue with some pipelines being lost. We are rolling back the affected service, and will share more information when we have it.

2. investigating May 06, 2026, 07:43 PM UTC

   We are continuing to investigate this issue.

3. monitoring May 06, 2026, 08:03 PM UTC

   The rollback was successful. Pipelines are flowing normally again. Monitoring for a bit.

4. resolved May 06, 2026, 08:13 PM UTC

   This incident is resolved. Thank you for your patience, and we apologize for any inconvenience.

Read the full incident report →

Started May 06, 2026, 05:54 PM UTC· resolved May 06, 2026, 09:26 PM UTC

1. monitoring May 06, 2026, 05:54 PM UTC

   GitHub is reporting a major incident for degraded pull request availability. This does not impact running CircleCI builds for newly created pull requests or push events.

2. monitoring May 06, 2026, 05:54 PM UTC

   We are continuing to monitor for any further issues.

3. resolved May 06, 2026, 09:26 PM UTC

   This incident has been resolved.

Read the full incident report →